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Ernest E. Figari, Jr., * A. Erin Dwyer** and Donald Colleluori**
rUDICIAL decisions and amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
durel and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure2 shaped the major
developments in the field of civil procedure during the Survey period.
This Article examines these developments and considers their impact on ex-
isting Texas procedure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
The most significant development in the area of subject matter jurisdiction
was Tafflin v. Levitt,3 a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court,
which is destined to increase the caseload of Texas state courts. Overruling
the Texas view on the matter,4 the Court authoritatively held that state
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Method-
ist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at law, Dallas,
Texas.
*** B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas.
1. The Texas Supreme Court amended the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure twice during
the survey period. Initially, the Texas Supreme Court modified 60 rules, added five new rules,
and repealed five rules of civil procedure. These changes became effective September 1, 1990.
See Changes to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Texas
Rules of Evidence, 53 TEX. B.J. 589 (1990). Later, the Texas Supreme Court withdrew three
of its earlier amendments, revised the same three rules a second time, and amended one addi-
tional rule. This second set of changes became effective retroactively to September 1, 1990.
See Changes to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 53
TEX. B.J. 1033 (1990).
2. The Texas Supreme Court also amended the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
twice during the survey period. Initially, the Texas Supreme Court modified 44 rules and
added one new rule of appellate procedure. These changes became effective September 1,
1990. See Changes to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
Texas Rules of Evidence, 53 TEX. B.J. 589 (1990). Subsequently, the Texas Supreme Court
withdrew one of the earlier amendments, revised the same rule a second time, and amended
one additional rule. This second set of changes became effective retroactively to September 1,
1990. See Changes to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
53 TEx. B.J. 1033 (1990).
3. 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990).
4. Before Tafflin, appellate courts in Texas unanimously held that state courts do not
have subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought under RICO. See Greenstein, Logan &
Co. v. Burgess Mktg., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170, 180 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied); Main
Rusk Assoc. v. Interior Space Constr., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985, no writ); accord Chivas Prod. Ltd. v. Owen, 864 F.2d 1280, 1286 (6th Cir. 1988);
Cacioppe v. Superior Holsteins III, Ltd., 650 F. Supp. 607, 608 nn.l-2 (S.D. Tex. 1986);
Broadway v. San Antonio Shoe, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 584, 586 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Spence v. Flynt,
647 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D. Wyo. 1986); Massey v. Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81, 84
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courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with federal courts over
civil claims brought under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act.- In Peek v. Equipment Service Co.,6 the Texas Supreme
Court answered the question of whether a plaintiff invokes the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of a trial court by filing a petition which fails to allege either
a specific amount of damages or that the damages sustained exceed the
court's minimum jurisdictional limits. Concluding that the plaintiff's omis-
sion of any assertion regarding the amount in controversy did not deprive
the court of jurisdiction, the supreme court found that such constituted a
pleading defect subject to special exception and amendment. 7
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The reach of the Texas long-arm statute8 continues to be the subject of
judicial measurement. A recent decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit, Bullion v. Gillespie,9 suggests that the statute's
reach may be longer in the case of service on a non-resident physician who
has caused a resident to suffer adverse medical consequences in Texas. The
plaintiff, a Texas resident, suffered from an unusual disorder and, on the
recommendation of her Texas physician, contacted a specialist who prac-
ticed medicine in California. The plaintiff subsequently traveled to Califor-
nia for examination and treatment by the specialist and, while there, agreed
to participate in an experimental treatment program for her disorder. After
returning to Texas, the plaintiff received three separate deliveries of an ex-
perimental drug which she took under the supervision of her local physician.
Her local physician then reported the results to the specialist in California.
The plaintiff made a series of payments to the specialist for the medical serv-
(W.D. Okla. 1986); Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 1365, 1370-71 (D.C.
Wash. 1985); VanderWeyst v. First State Bank, 425 N.W.2d 803, 812 (Minn.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 943 (1988); Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d 468,
489 N.Y.S.2d 502, 504-6 (1985). Contra McCarter v. Mitcham, 883 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir.
1989); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1193-95 (4th Cir. 1988); Lou v. Belzberg, 834
F.2d 730, 738-39 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988); DuBroff v. DuBroff, 833
F.2d 557, 562 (5th Cir. 1987); County of Cook v. MidCon Corp. 773 F.2d 892, 898 (7th Cir.
1985); Contemporary Servs. Corp. v. Universal City Studios Inc., 655 F. Supp. 885, 893 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); Carman v. First Natl Bank, 642 F. Supp. 862, 864 (W.D. Ky. 1986); HMK Corp.
v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 717 (E.D. Va. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1009 (1988); Chas.
Kurz Co. v. Lombardi, 595 F. Supp. 373, 381 n.ll (E.D. Pa. 1984); Luebke v. Marine Nat'l
Bank, 567 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903,
908-16, 710 P.2d 375, 376-82, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 576-82 (1985); Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leu-
cadia, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 450, 461, 530 N.E.2d 860, 866 (1988); Rice v. Janovich, 109 Wash.2d
48, 55, 742 P.2d 1230, 1235 (1987). See generally Comment, Adjudication of Civil RICO Ac-
tions - State Courts Get An Offer They Can't Refuse: Lou V Belzberg 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
301 (1988); Note, Civil RICO: The Propriety of Concurrent State Court Subject Matter Juris-
diction 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 271 (1988); Note, Concurrent Jurisdiction Over RICO Claims,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 1047 (1988).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
6. 779 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1989).
7. Id. at 805.
8. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-45 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991)
(formerly TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1985)).
9. 895 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1990).
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ices and drugs and, in turn, received related correspondence from the spe-
cialist. Subsequently, the plaintiff experienced a worsened condition which
she attributed to the experimental drug. She filed suit in Texas against the
specialist, alleging medical malpractice and deceptive trade practices, and
obtained service under the long-arm statute. The record showed that, while
the specialist was licensed to practice medicine in California, she was not
licensed in Texas. The record also indicated that the specialist neither solic-
ited the plaintiff as a patient nor traveled to Texas to treat or examine her.
Finding these contacts insufficient for jurisdictional purposes, the trial court
dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction and an appeal ensued.
In reversing the dismissal, the opinion of the Fifth Circuit provided proce-
dural and substantive guidance in this area. Rejecting the view that the bur-
den was on the plaintiff to sustain personal jurisdiction by a preponderance
of the evidence, the court reiterated that she was only obliged to establish the
necessary contacts by a prima facie showing. Acknowledging that key juris-
dictional facts were in dispute, the court nevertheless concluded that under
the prima facie standard it had to accept as true the plaintiff's evidence that
the specialist shipped drugs to her in Texas that proximately caused her inju-
ries. Concluding that the alleged tort took place in whole or part in Texas,
the Fifth Circuit cautioned that Texas had an ardent interest in protecting its
citizens from unlicensed physicians dispensing harmful experimental
drugs.10
In Saktides v. Cooper,1' a federal district court applied the "fiduciary
shield" principle12 to determine the amenability of a non-resident employee
of a foreign corporation to service under the long-arm statute on the basis of
the employee's contacts with the forum state on behalf of the corporation.1
3
The plaintiff sued the non-residerit employee on several causes of action, ef-
fecting service under the long-arm statute and arguing that the court had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant employee because of his contacts
with Texas as an agent of the corporation. Declining to sustain service, the
court reasoned that a corporate agent whose only contact with the forum is
through performance of his official duties is not subject to personal jurisdic-
tion in the forum by virtue of such contact.14
10. The court stated that "Texas has a strong interest in protecting its citizens from alleg-
edly harmful experimental drugs, dispensed by those not licensed to practice within the state."
Id. at 217.
11. 742 F. Supp. 382 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
12. The fiduciary shield principle provides: "[I]f an individual has contact with a particu-
lar state only by virtue of his acts as a fiduciary of the corporation, he may be shielded from the
exercise, by that state, of jurisdiction over him personally on the basis of that conduct."
Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981); accord Weller v. Cromwell
Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 929 (6th Cir. 1974) (jurisdiction over corporation's individual officers
cannot be based solely upon jurisdiction over corporation); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d
1277, 1281 n.8 (10th Cir. 1969) (even if foreign corporation is subject to service because it
transacts business through agents operating in forum state, such agents are not engaged in
business so as to allow application of long-arm statue to them as individuals unless agents
transact business on their own behalf apart from corporation).
13. 742 F. Supp. at 385-87.
14. Id. at 387. Rather, the court concluded that
(flrom a policy perspective, it would offend traditional notions of fair play and
1991]
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The Texas Supreme Court, in Schlobohm v. Schapiro,"5 modernized the
Texas test governing the determination of personal jurisdiction. Previously,
federal decisions' 6 concluded that when effecting service under the long-arm
statute, due process requirements could be satisfied either "generally"' 7 or
"specifically."' 8 As originally formulated, however, the Texas test did not
allow for such requirements to be satisfied "generally" through the use of
continuing and systematic contacts unrelated to the asserted claim.' 9 Ac-
knowledging that its rulings had not kept pace with evolving federal prece-
dent in the area, the supreme court concluded that, if not modified, its test
could convey the false belief that jurisdiction may be based only on the act or
transaction of the defendant that gave rise to the cause of action.20 Accord-
ingly, the supreme court reformulated the Texas test to provide that if the
cause of action does not arise from a specific act or transaction, jurisdiction
may nevertheless be exercised if the defendant's contacts with Texas are con-
tinuous and systematic. 2'
A relatively obscure provision of the Texas long-arm statute2 2 received
attention during the survey period. Section 17.045 of that statute stipulates
that when process is delivered to the Secretary of State for forwarding to a
non-resident defendant, the process must contain a statement of the name
and address of the non-resident's home or home office to facilitate such for-
warding. 23 Two cases, Lissak v. Health International, Inc.24 and Mahon v.
substantial justice to force employees who have had occasion to do business by
telephone or mail with any number of given states to require that they defend
lawsuits in these states in their individual capacity based on acts performed not
for their own benefit, but for the benefit of their employer.
Id.
See Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978);
Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 637(8th Cir. 1975); Bamford v. Hobbs, 569 F. Supp. 160, 168 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Siskind v. Villa
Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. 1982). See generally Figari, Graves &
Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 289, 292 (1983)
(discussing corporate agents' amenability to service).
15. 784 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1990).
16. See Southmark Corp. v. Life Inv., Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 772-73 (5th Cir. 1988); Smith v.
Dainichi Kinzoky Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp. 847, 852-53 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
17. "'General jurisdiction' is personal jurisdiction based on a defendant's contacts with
the forum that are unrelated to the controversy. To exercise general jurisdiction, the court
must determine whether 'the contacts are sufficiently systematic and continuous as to support
a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction.'" 851 F.2d at 772 (citation omitted).
18. "'Specific jurisdiction' ... is personal jurisdiction based on contacts with the forum
that are related to the particular controversy. Even a single purposeful contact may in a
proper case be sufficient to meet the requirement of minimum contacts when the cause of
action arises from the contact." Id. (citation omitted).
19. The supreme court noted that under the Texas test, as originally articulated in
O'Brien v. Lampar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966), in order to satisfy due process
requirements, the cause of action "must arise from, or be connected with" the nonresident's
contacts with Texas. 784 S.W.2d at 358.
20. 784 S.W.2d at 358.
21. Id.
22. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045 (a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
23. Id.




Caldwell, Haddad, Skaggs, Inc. 25 considered this address requirement. Reit-
erating that the provision requires a statement of the individual's home ad-
dress when service is sought to be made on an individual defendant,26 the
court in Lissak set aside a default judgment because the record showed that
process had been forwarded to the individual's former business address. 27
Mahon arose from a challenge to a default judgment taken against an indi-
vidual defendant in a suit on a lease. Arguing that the address requirement
had been fulfilled, the plaintiff asserted that the lease, which had been intro-
duced into evidence as an exhibit at the default hearing, set forth a business
address for the defendant and that this was the address it had supplied to the
Secretary of State for forwarding service.28 During the 1989 Survey period,
a court of appeals held the reference to home office in the statute was inap-
plicable to an individual and that, in the case of a natural person, a home
address must be utilized. 29 Apparently overlooking this decision, the Mahon
court approved the home office reference for use in the case of an individual
defendant and upheld the default judgment, reasoning that where a contract
provides only one address, such address constitutes the home office of the
party.30
Il. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Former rule 120a3 1, which governed special appearance practice in Texas,
has been a source of uncertainty for a party attempting to establish his posi-
tion on personal jurisdiction at a special appearance hearing. Due to the
former rule's failure to specify the type of proof the trial court may receive at
a special appearance hearing, the propriety of using pleadings and affidavits
for this purpose had been in doubt.32 Adhering to a strict approach under
former rule 120a, the court in Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Hanson33
25. 783 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1990, no writ).
26. No. C14-89-00489-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], Mar. 22, 1990, no writ)
(unpublished opinion); accord Chaves v. Todaro, 770 S.W.2d 944, 946 (rex. App.-Houston
[Ist Dist.] 1989, no writ); Bannigan v. Market St. Dev., Ltd., 766 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
27. No. C14-89-00489-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], Mar. 22, 1990, no writ)
(unpublished opinion).
28. 783 S.W.2d 771.
29. See Chaves v. Todaro, 770 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. App.-Houston (ist Dist.] 1989, no
writ).
30. 783 S.W.2d at 771. But see Chaves v. Todaro, 770 S.W.2d at 944-46.
31. TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a (1983).
32. See Haskell v. Border City Bank, 649 S.W.2d 133, 135 (rex. App.-El Paso 1983, no
writ) (affidavits are inadmissible hearsay); Main Bank & Trust v. Nye, 571 S.W.2d 222, 223
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court's research disclosed no cases ruling on
admissibility of affidavits at special appearance hearings). In contrast, when an objection to
personal jurisdiction is asserted in federal court, affidavits and uncontroverted pleadings repre-
sent a proper method of proof. See, eg., D.J. Investments, Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire
Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 1985) (uncontroverted allegations in the plain-
tiff's complaint must be taken as true for jurisdictional purposes); Edwards v. Associated
Press, 512 F.2d 258, 262 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975) (appropriate to consider affidavits when resolving
jurisdictional disputes); O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1971)
(courts may receive and weigh affidavits when considering jurisdictional challenge).
33. 792 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
1991]
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disallowed the use of either pleadings or affidavits at special appearance
hearings.3 4 Modernizing this aspect of the practice, rule 120a was amended
effective September 1, 1990 to permit the trial court to determine a special
appearance on the basis of pleadings and affidavits, as well as the results of
discovery and oral testimony.35 If affidavits are used at a special appearance,
however, the amended rule requires that such affidavits must be served at
least seven days before the hearing, be made on personal knowledge, set
forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify. 36 In the event the party oppos-
ing the special appearance can demonstrate that he cannot present facts
essential to justify his opposition by affidavit, the trial court may order a
continuance to allow the opposing party adequate time to obtain affidavits,
depositions or conduct discovery. The trial court may also make such other
orders, as are just.37 As a safeguard, amended rule 120a further provides
that if the trial court concludes that any affidavits presented are made in bad
faith, the court may impose rule 13 sanction for the filing of a groundless
pleading. 38 Despite these important changes to rule 120a, the advisory com-
ment makes it clear that the amendments preserve prior Texas practice of
placing the burden of proof on the party contesting the court's jurisdiction.39
The trial practitioner representing a nonresident defendant at a special
appearance hearing in state court should be aware of the implications of
General Electric Co. v. Brown & Ross International Distributors, Inc..40 Reit-
erating that a non-resident defendant has the burden of proof at a special
appearance hearing, 4' the court emphasized that this burden forces the non-
34. Id. at 508.
35. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 120(3); see also Carlson, Procedure Update: 1990 Amendments to
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellate Practice, 9 ADvoc. 223, 227 (Oct. 1990).
36. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a(3). It appears that these affidavit requirements were borrowed
from rule 166a which governs the use of affidavits in the summary judgment context. TEX. R.
Civ. P. 166a(e) stipulates that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirm-
atively that the affiant is competent to testify." As a result, case law discussing the standards
applicable to summary judgment affidavits should provide guidance respecting the use of affi-
davits in the special appearance area.
37. TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a(3); see Carlson, supra note 35 at 227. This aspect of amended
rule 120a was also derived from summary judgment practice under rule 166a. TEX. R. Civ. P.
166a(f) provides "should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is
just."
38. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 13. Similarly, a provision in rule 166a authorizes the imposition
of sanctions for affidavits which have been submitted "in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay." See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(g).
39. TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a (advisory comment).
40. No. 01-89-0369-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.], May 31, 1990, no writ) (opinion
not yet reported).
41. Id.; see, e.g., Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434,438 (Tex. 1982)
(defendant must negate all bases of personal jurisdiction); Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d
52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (burden of proof and persuasion on
nonresident defendant); Taylor v. American Emery Wheel Works, 480 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex.
Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1972, no writ) (nonresident defendant bears burden of pleading
and proving lack of jurisdiction). But see Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d
[Vol. 45
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resident to adduce evidence negating all bases of personal jurisdiction.42 In
order to prevail at a special appearance hearing, the nonresident defendant
must present evidence negating both a specific basis43 and a general basis44
for personal jurisdiction.4 5
Rule 120a has always required a party making a special appearance to file
a sworn motion prior to any other pleading or motion.46 As originally en-
acted, rule 120a did not provide for an amendment of the special appearance
motion to correct a deficiency. 47 Consequently, the filing of an unsworn mo-
tion constituted a general appearance which subjected the movant to the
court's jurisdiction for all purposes.48 Later versions of rule 120a, however,
permitted amendments to special appearance motions to cure such defects. 49
Focusing on this advancement in the rule, earlier cases50 concluded that rule
120a permitted an amendment to supply a verification of the motion. Re-
cently, Villalpando v. De La Garza 51 considered the situation where the de-
1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1980) (if defendant challenges jurisdiction, plaintiff has burden of proof),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 490
(5th Cir. 1974) (party invoking personal jurisdiction has burden of proof); Jetco Elec. Indus.,
Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff must establish prima facie
showing that long-arm statute satisfied).
42. No. 01-80-00369-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.], May 31, 1990, no writ) (opin-
ion not yet reported); accord Zae Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 734 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex.
1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988) ("[I]t is incumbent upon the nonresident defendant to
negate all bases of personal jurisdiction").
43. "Specific" personal jurisdiction exists when the cause of action relates to the defend-
ant's contacts with the forum and those contacts were occasioned by the defendant's pur-
poseful conduct. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98
(1980) (defendant must have clear notice that its acts may support personal jurisdiction);
Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987) (defendant subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction if it invokes benefits and protection of forum state's laws). A plaintiff can-
not, by its conduct alone, establish the requisite minimum contacts. World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 298 (citing Hanson v. Penchla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
44. "General" personal jurisdiction exists when the cause of action does not relate to the
defendant's purposeful conduct within the forum, but the defendant's contacts with the forum
are continuous and systematic. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414-17 (1984) (general personal jurisdiction requires contacts of continuous and system-
atic nature); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987) (due process
demands continuous and systematic contacts for general jurisdiction).
45. No. 01-89-00369-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], May 31, 1990, no writ) (opin-
ion not yet reported); Zac Smith & Co., 734 S.W.2d at 664; Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784
S.W.2d 355, 358-59 (rex. 1990).
46. TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a.
47. TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a (Vernon 1966).
48. See Stewart v. Walton Enter., Inc., 496 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Austin Rankin Corp. v. Cadillac Pool Corp., 421 S.W.2d 733, 734
(rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967, no writ).
49. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a(1). See generally Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 293, 294 (1976) (review of developments in Texas civil
procedure).
50. See Stegall & Stegall v. Cohn, 592 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1979, no writ) (record did not support plaintiff's contention that defendants waived their spe-
cial appearance by failing to seek a hearing on the motion to dismiss); Dennett v. First Conti-
nental Inv. Corp., 559 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ) (special
appearances may be amended to cure defects); cf. Duncan v. Denton County, 133 S.W.2d 197,
198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939, writ dism'd) (amendment of unsworn controverting
affidavit to add verification permitted).
51. 793 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
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fendant filed an unsworn motion but failed to amend such motion prior to
the special appearance hearing and supply the required verification. Finding
a waiver in such instance, the appellate court concluded that the defendant's
failure to cure the defect prior to the hearing, even in the absence of a special
exception or objection, constituted a general appearance and submitted the
defendant to personal jurisdiction.52
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The Supreme Court of Texas rendered a sharply divided opinion in Hig-
ginbotham v. General Life & Accident Insurance Co.,53 and opened a Pan-
dora's box of procedural ills. Former article 3.64 of the Texas Insurance
Code,54 which applied to the issue in question, authorized service on a do-
mestic insurance company at the home offices of the company during busi-
ness hours.55 The plaintiff effected service on the two defendants, both of
whom were domestic insurance companies, by leaving process at their home
office on a specified date "at 12:01 o'clock p.m." On the basis of this service,
the trial court entered a default judgment against the defendants. The de-
fendants subsequently sought to set the default judgment aside by filing a
motion for new trial. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion
and, after receiving evidence, denied the motion and entered an order finding
that service was proper under the statute. Noting that nothing in the record
indicated that the specified time of service was during the defendants' "busi-
ness hours," the court of appeals found that the plaintiff did not comply with
the applicable statute and thus set aside the default judgment.56 The
supreme court, however, relied on the evidence adduced at the hearing on
the motion for new trial to conclude that the omission had been corrected
after-the-fact. The majority held the trial court's order denying a new trial
was "tantamount to a formal amendment of the return of citation" under
rule 118,57 and therefore, the record sufficiently showed valid service.58 Sug-
gesting that the majority "cavalierly" changed Texas law59 with its "remark-
52. Id. at 276.
53. 796 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1990) (5-4 decision).
54. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.64 (Vernon 1981), repealed, Act of April 30, 1987, ch.
46, § 12, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 179, 188.
55. Id.
56. See General Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Higginbotham, 750 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1988), rev'd, 796 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1990). See generally Figari, Graves &
Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 485, 492 (1989)
(review of developments in Texas civil procedure).
57. 796 S.W.2d at 697. TEX. R. Civ. P. 118 provides that "[a]t any time in its discretion
and upon such notice and on such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or
proof of service thereof to be amended .... It should be noted that the hearing before the
trial court related to the defendants' motion for new trial and, as a result, they had no warning
or notice that an amendment of the deficient return would arise from such hearing. See 796
S.W.2d at 696. Indeed, when the trial court entered its order denying the motion for new trial,
it did not even purport to amend the defective return; rather, it was not until the matter came
under appellate review by the supreme court that such a view was espoused. Id. at 697.
58. Id. at 697.
59. Id. at 700.
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able holding", 6° the dissent forcefully argued that under long-standing Texas
precedent evidence received after a judgment to correct process cannot sup-
ply necessary information not found in the record when the judge signed the
order.61
In Wilson v. Dunn 62 the supreme court reviewed the propriety of a default
judgment obtained on the basis of substituted service. The plaintiff, after
having made repeated attempts at personal service on the defendant, filed a
motion for substituted service under rule 106.63 Although rule 106 requires
that a motion for substituted service be supported by an affidavit,64 the plain-
tiff obtained an order from the trial court authorizing substituted service
without such affidavit. 65 Subsequently, the trial court relied on the substi-
tuted service and entered a default judgment against the defendant. Upon
learning of the default, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial. After a
hearing, however, the court denied the motion. On review the supreme
court found that the plaintiff's failure to comply with rule 106 and supply
the trial court with the required affidavit invalidated the substituted service
and necessitated that the default judgment be set aside. Furthermore,
although the plaintiff established at the hearing before the trial court that the
defendant had notice of the suit, the supreme court nevertheless concluded
that actual notice to the defendant, without proper service, was insufficient
to give the trial court jurisdiction. 66
In Retail Technologies, Inc. v. Palm City T V, Inc.67 the trial court en-
tered a default judgment against a defendant on the basis of a return of ser-
vice that was not signed by the service officer. On review of the record an
appellate court, emphasizing that rule 10768 mandates that the service officer
sign the return before filing it, held that the omission was fatal to service and
set aside the default judgment.69
V. PLEADINGS
Several amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure constituted the
most significant developments in the area of pleadings. First, rule 13,70
which attempts to deter the filing of frivolous pleadings,7 ' underwent signifi-
60. Id. at 699.
61. Id.
62. 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990).
63. TEx. R. Civ. P. 106.
64. TEx. R. Civ. P. 106(b).
65. 800 S.W.2d at 833-34.
66. Id. at 63.
67. 791 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
68. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107.
69. 791 S.W.2d at 347.
70. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
71. See generally Benedetto & Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices (Including the Friv-
olous Suit Question), 1987 ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL INSTUTUTE: CIVIL
PROCEDURE 1988-RuLEs AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-2 to -12 (discussing legislative his-
tory, purpose, and effect of rule 13); Carlson, Procedural Changes Mandated by the 1988 Rule
Changes, 6 ADvoc. 22, 23 (1987) (discussing frivolous suit deterrence purpose of rule 13).
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cant changes during the survey period. 72 Rule 13 has always provided that
the signatures of attorneys or parties on a court filing certify that they have
read it and that the filing "is not groundless and brought in bad faith or
groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment."'13 The rule defines
groundless as "no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law.' 74 If a party
or attorney signs a filing in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or
its own initiative, shall impose sanctions upon the person who signed such
filing, a represented party, or both.75 Originally, the rule clearly empowered
the trial court to levy sanctions on its own motion.76 Furthermore, the rule
did not require advance notice to the offending party.7" As a result, one case
during the 1989 survey period had held that prior notice was not required.' 8
Amended rule 13 now specifically requires that the trial court defer imposi-
tion of sanctions until after notice and a hearing. 79 Further, amended rule
13 now requires that any sanctions imposed be appropriate for the
violation.80
Former rule 1381 was ineffective because it provided that a trial court
could not impose sanctions if, before the earliest of either the 90th day after
the court determined a violation or prior to the expiration of the trial court's
plenary power, the offending party withdrew or amended the filing to the
satisfaction of the court.8 2 Rule 13 was amended to eliminate this ninety day
grace period and thereby increase its effectiveness.8 3
72. Tax. R. Civ. P. 13.
73. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13; see also FED. R. Civ. P. I1 (analogous federal rule governing
signing of pleadings). See generally 5 Wright & Miller, FED. PAc. & PROC. §§ 1331-35 (2d
Ed. 1990) (discussing federal analogous to TEx. R. Civ. P. 13).
74. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. Two filings, however, are exempt from the scope of the rule 13.
Specifically, the rule provides that neither a general denial nor the amount requested for dam-
ages in a pleading may constitute a violation. Id.
75. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. It should be noted that one case during the survey period clarified
that former rule 13 does not apply to a nonparty. See Texas Att'y Generals Office v. Adams,
793 S.W.2d 771, 775 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1990, no writ). Under Rule 13, the trial court
may impose sanctions against the offending party which include disallowance of further dis-
covery, assessment of discovery expenses or taxable costs, establishment of designated facts,
refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose claims or defenses, striking plead-
ings, dismissal of claims, rendition of a default judgment, and contempt. See TEX R. Civ. P.
215(2)(b) (miscellaneous sanctions); TEx. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b)(6) (contempt).
76. TEx. R. Civ. P. 13 (1988).
77. Id.
78. Goad v. Goad, 768 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied), cert
denied, 110 S. Ct. 722, (1990).
79. TEx. R. Civ. P. 13; see Carlson, supra note 35, at 224.
80. TEx. R. Civ. P. 13.
81. TEx. R. Civ. P. 13.
82. Id. Focusing on this aspect of the rule, a court during a prior survey period held rule
13 did not impose on the trial court the burden of notifying the litigant of his right to withdraw
or amend the offending pleading. See Cloughly v. NBC Bank-Seguin, 773 S.W.2d 652, 656-57
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
83. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 13; Carlson, supra note 35, at 224; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11
(analogous federal rule governing signing of pleadings). See generally 5 Wright & Miller, FED.
PRAC. & PROC. §§ 1331-35 (2d Ed. 1990) (discussing federal rule analogous to amended TEX.
R. Civ. P. 13).
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The rules84 setting forth service requirements with respect to pleadings
have been consolidated into amended rule 21.85 Reverting to earlier prac-
tice, all instruments fied with the clerk must now be served on all parties,
not just adverse parties.86
Rule 21a, which authorizes various methods for serving filings, was
amended to keep pace with advancing technology. The rule now provides
that service may be effected by "telephonic document transfer."87 In an ef-
fort to avoid an aggressive use of this method of service, however, the rule
further provides that telephonic document transfer service after 5:00 p.m.
local time of the recipient shall be deemed served on the next day.88 To aid
practitioners in the use of this new method of service, the court now requires
all filings to provide, if available, attorney telecopier information.8 9
Furthermore, rule 4590 was amended to permit a copy of a pleading to be
filed with the clerk, presumably by fax if desired.91 When a pleading is re-
quired to be verified, 92 however, the amended rules nevertheless permit a
copy to be filed with the clerk93 and served on the other parties to the litiga-
tion,94 provided the party making the filing maintains the signed original for
inspection by the court or any party, should a question be raised as to its
authenticity.9" Finally, new rule 21b authorizes the trial court, after notice
and hearing, to impose certain sanctions against a party who fails to serve
filings in accordance with the rules.96
Taking a cue from a recent case,97 which recognized modem technology
at the courthouse, the Texas Supreme Court amended rule 26.98 The
amended rule allows the court clerk to keep a court docket in a permanent
record, 99 such as on a computer system, rather than in a bound book as the
former rule required. 10
Former rule 63 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provided that par-
ties may amend their pleadings by filing them with the clerk; parties may file
any amendment within seven days of the trial date or less only after leave is
84. TEX. R. Civ. P. 72 (1988), 73 (1981).
85. TEx. R. Civ. P. 21; see Carlson, supra note 35, at 225-26.
86. Id.
87. TEx. R. Civ. P. 21a; see Carlson, supra note 35, at 226.
88. Id.
89. TEx. R. CiV. P. 57; see Carlson, supra note 35, at 226.
90. TEx. R. Civ. P. 45.
91. See Carlson, supra note 35, at 226.
92. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 93, 185, 682, 690.
93. TEx. R. Civ. P. 45; see Carlson, supra note 35, at 226.
94. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 21 & 21a.
95. TEX. R. Civ. P. 45.
96. TEx. R. Civ. P. 21b; see Carlson, supra note 35, at 226.
97. See Gibraltar Say. Ass'n v. Kilpatrick, 770 S.W.2d 14, 17-18 (rex. App.-Texarkana
1989, writ denied) ("[t]he fact that the computerized record has not yet been reduced to paper
writing does not mean it is not a part of the court record, so long as it is capable of being
transcribed").
98. TEx. R. Civ. P. 26.
99. Id.
100. TEx. R. Civ. P. 26 (1963).
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obtained. ' 01 Previously, doubt had arisen as to the intended scope of the
word "amendment" under rule 63. For instance, troubling issues included
whether rule 63 applied to all pleadings after the first in a series or whether
rule 63 applied to original pleadings provided they were tendered for filing
after a time limit authorized by the rule. One court'0 2 took a liberal ap-
proach to the former rule's interpretation and concluded that an original
counterclaim by a defendant, being "supplemental" to the record, 0 3 was
required to be filed within the time allowed by the rule."14 In an attempt to
clarify this area, Texas recently amended rule 63 to require that the trial
pleadings of all parties, except those permitted by way of trial amendment,
be on file at least seven days before trial unless leave of court permitted later
filing.' 05
VI. SEALING OF COURT RECORDS
The presumption at common law is well established that all court records
are open to the public.'0 6 Hence, when a party sought to have court records
sealed, such party had to satisfy certain procedural and substantive require-
ments in order to overcome this presumption of openness.' 0 7 These require-
ments, being a matter of common law, were not always readily
discernable. 08 Apparently aimed at definitizing such requirements, the leg-
islature recently enacted a statute' 09 directing the Texas Supreme Court to
establish procedures for the sealing of court records. In response to this
mandate, the Texas Supreme Court recently adopted rule 76a, 110 which be-
came effective September 1, 1990 and governs the sealing of court records.' 1 '
101. TEx. R. Civ. P. §3 (1961).
102. Brown Lex Real Estate Dev. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank-South, 736 S.W.2d 205
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd, n.r.e.).
103. Id. at 206; accord Hawkins v. Anderson, 672 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1984, no writ); Claude Regis Vargo Enter. v. Bacarisse, 578 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Box v. Associates Inv. Co., 389 S.W.2d
687, 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, no writ).
104. 736 S.W.2d at 206.
105. TEX. R. Civ. P. 63; see Carlson, supra note 35, at 226. It should be noted in passing
that one case during the survey period held that the "date of trial" language in the rule refers
to the date the case is set for trial and not the date the trial actually begins. See Carr v.
Houston Business Forms, Inc., 794 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990,
no writ).
106. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
107. See Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802 (11th Cir. 1983) ("proper notice" to the
public required); In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983) (public
must be allowed a "reasonable opportunity to present their claims").
108. See Doggett, Rule 76a - Sealing of Court Records, 9 ADVOC. 143 (June 1990).
109. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.010 (Vernon Supp. 1991). The statute provides
that "[t]he supreme court shall adopt rules establishing guidelines for the courts of this state to
use in determining whether in the interest of justice the records in a civil case, including settle-
ments, should be sealed." See also Carlson, supra note 35, at 226.
110. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a; see generally Doggett, supra note 108, at 143-48; Carlson, supra
note 35, at 226-27.
111. The Texas Supreme Court adopted rule 76a over the dissent of two justices who de-
scribed the rule as the most controversial of any in the history of the court. See Changes to
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and Texas Rules of Civil
Evidence, 53 TEX. B.J. 589, 590 (1990).
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A. Scope of Application
Rule 76a applies to suits filed after its effective date or to court records
filed or exchanged after that date in suits pending on its effective date.112
Court records, for purposes of the rule, mean any and all documents filed in
connection with any matter before any civil court 13 as well as any settle-
ment agreements and discovery not fied of record, which concern matters
that have "a probable adverse effect upon the general public health or safety,
.. . the administration of public office, . . . or the operation of govern-
ment."114 The definition of court records contained in the rule, however,
expressly excludes documents filed en camera to obtain a discovery ruling,
documents to which access is restricted by law, or documents filed in an
action under the Texas Family Code.' 15
. Procedural Requirements
Under the practice at common law, before any sealing could take place, a
party seeking to seal court records had to afford the public both reasonable
notice of and an opportunity to be heard in the matter.t 1 6 Codifying the
notice requirement, rule 76a requires the movant to post a public notice at
the "site where notices for meetings of county governmental bodies are to be
posted;" such notice must set forth the date and place of the proposed hear-
ing and the particulars of the case as listed in the rule. 117 Further, immedi-
ately after posting such notice, the movant must file a verified copy of it with
the clerk of the trial court and with the clerk of the supreme court." 18
With regard to the second common law requirement, rule 76a mandates
that a hearing on a motion to seal court records must be held in open court
not less than fourteen days after the movant has filed the motion and posted
notice. 1 9 Apparently continuing the practice under common law, rule 76a
stipulates that the hearing on a motion to seal must be held in open court,
that is, "open to the public." 120 The rule, however, permits the trial court to
inspect records in camera when necessary.12'
Regarding the evidence to be adduced at a hearing, rule 76a incorporates
112. TEx. R. Cv. P. 76a(9). In this regard, one authority noted that "court records ex-
changed in those cases (Le., cases pending on the effective date of the rule] after that date are
subject to the rule's provisions even f covered by a prior sealing or protective order. Moreover,
any motions in a pending case to alter a sealing order that has been issued prior to September 1
are governed by the new rule." Doggett, supra note 108, at 146 (emphasis added). Rule 76a
expressly states it does not apply to any court records sealed in an action in which a final
judgment had been entered before its effective date. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(9).
113. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(a); see Doggett, supra note 108, at 144-45.
114. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(b),(c).
115. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76A(2)(a)(1),(2),(3).
116. Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802 (11th Cir. 1983).
117. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(3); see Carlson, supra note 35, at 227; Doggett, supra note 108, at
145.
118. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(3).
119. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(4). See Carlson, supra note 35, at 227; Doggett, supra note 108,
at 145.
120. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(4).
121. Id.
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the procedure applicable to the determination of a special appearance under
rule 120a. 122 The rule thereby authorizes the use of affidavits in connection
with a motion to seal provided they are served at least seven days before the
hearing, are made on personal knowledge, show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify, and set forth specific facts that would be admissible
in evidence.1 23 At the conclusion of a properly conducted hearing, if the
trial court orders any part of the record to be sealed, the trial court order
must specify the court's reasons for finding and concluding whether the re-
quired showing has been made, identify the specific portions of the court
records to be sealed, and state how long such portion of the court records are
to remain sealed.124
C. Substantive Requirements
Rule 76a reiterates the common law rule that court records "are presumed
to be open to the general public."' 125 The rule also mandates that court
records may be sealed only upon a showing that a specified, serious and
substantial interest clearly outweighs both this presumption of openness and
any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon general public health
or safety. Further, the movant must demonstrate that no less restrictive
means than sealing records will adequately and effectively protect the spe-
cific interest asserted.126 Hence, in order to overcome the presumption of
openness, a movant under the rule must establish the possession of "a speci-
fied, serious, and substantial interest" which clearly outweighs such pre-
sumption and that less restrictive means will not protect the specific interest
involved.127
122. Id.
123. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a; see supra notes 36-50; Doggett, supra note 108, at 145.
124. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(6); see also Doggett, supra note 108, at 145.
125. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(1). In this connection one commentator has cautioned that "rule
76a begins with the clear presumption that all civil court records are open to the public. In
those rare instances when closure should be authorized, a court must first satisfy certain sub-
stantive and procedural requirements." Doggett, supra note 108, at 144 (emphasis added).
Another authority discussing the first draft of rule 76a, observed that "the proposed rule be-
gins with the indisputable presumption that all civil court records are open to the public."
McElhaney & Leatherbury, An Overview: Proposed Rule 76a, 54 TEx. BAR J. 340 (1990) (em-
phasis added). Of course, the common law articulations of the presumption are myriad. See
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) ("It is clear that the courts
of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents,
including judicial records and documents."); Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 717 S.W.2d
933, 938 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986), rey'd on other grounds, 730 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1987) ("the
presumption of a public right of access to judicial records applies to civil cases as well as
criminal cases").
126. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(1); see Carlson, supra note 35, at 227; Doggett, supra note 108, at
144.
127. The standard that must be met in order to overcome the presumption of openness has
been described at common law using various terms. Regardless of the verbiage used, however,
the standard appears to be stringent. See, eg., Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d
1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985) (It must be shown that the denial to access is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest) (citing Globe Newspaper Corp. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 606-07 (1982)); In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983)
("Only the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records"); In re Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Only the most compelling circum-
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Garcia v. Peeples 128 a Texas Supreme Court decision during a prior survey
period in a discovery context, may provide guidance as to the nature of the
showing required to obtain a sealing order under rule 76a. The court re-
viewed an order issued under former rule 166b,129 which sealed materials
obtained during the discovery process, and emphasized that "a particular
and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped con-
clusory statements" was essential to justify such an order.130 Moreover, the
court cautioned that "sweeping predictions of injury" and "broad allegations
of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples'or articulated reasoning", do
not justify such extraordinary relief. 131 The showing required in Garcia for
obtaining a sealing order as to discovery materials not filed of record would
appear to apply with equal force to materials placed of record.'
32
D. Miscellaneous
Rule 76a authorizes the entry of an interim sealing order prior to a full
hearing on a motion to seal in specified circumstances. 133 The standard for
obtaining an interim sealing order, however, is stringent.1 34 Moreover, the
issuance of such an order does not reduce in any way the burden of proof of
a party at the hearing on the motion.' 35
The rule also modifies the existing practice 136 and states that "[a]ny per-
son may intervene as a matter of right at any time before or after judgment
to seal or unseal records."' 3 7 The rule further provides that a trial court
issuing a sealing order retains continuing jurisdiction to enforce or modify
stances should prevent.., public access"). The stringent standard may not be satisfied by an
agreement among the litigants. Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1571 n.4 (agreement of the parties, follow-
ing the filing of suit, to seal the court record does not outweigh the presumption of openness so
as to justify sealing).
128. 734 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1987). See generally Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Pro-
cedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 523, 545 (1988).
129. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b (1984).
130. 734 S.W.2d at 345 (citing United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir.
1978)).
131. 734 S.W.2d at 345 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3rd
Cir. 1986)).
132. Indeed, Tax. R. Civ. P. 166b(5), which governs the entry of sealing orders in the
discovery context, was also amended by the Texas supreme court when rule 76a was adopted.
Rule 166b(5) now provides that, whenever a litigant seeks to have discovery sealed or its dis-
closure limited, the trial court's determination of the matter "[s]hall be made in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 76a." In short, the court has decided that the sealing of all court-
related materials, whether placed of record or produced privately in the discovery process,
should comply with the procedures set forth in new rule 76a. See Doggett, supra note 108, at
145.
133. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(5); see Doggett, supra note 108, at 145.
134. See Doggett, supra note 108, at 145.
135. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(5).
136. See Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 730 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1987); Express-News Corp. v. Spears, 766
S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ). See generally Doggett, supra note 108,
at 145 n.18.
137. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a (7); see Doggett, supra note 108, at 145.
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the order.' 38
Finally, rule 76a grants the right to an interlocutory appeal from rulings
in this area. Any order sealing or unsealing court records shall be deemed to
be "a final judgment which may be appealed by any party or intervenor who
participated in the hearing."'1 39
VII. PARTIES
Rule 60140 sets forth the procedure under which a nonparty may intervene
in a suit. Under rule 60 an intervenor is not required to secure the trial
court's permission prior to intervening in a suit; instead, any party opposing
the intervention has the burden to challenge the intervention by a motion to
strike. 14 1 Faced with a situation where the trial court struck an intervention
on its own motion, the supreme court in Guaranty Federal Savings Bank v.
Horseshoe Operating Co. 142 held that, "[w]ithout a motion to strike, a trial
court abuses its discretion in striking an intervention."' 143 While rule 60
does not set a deadline by which a nonparty must intervene in a pending
suit,144 the absence of such a time limit has not gone unnoticed. Specifically,
the court in Highlands Insurance Co. v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty
Co. 14 concluded that, although rule 60 is silent on the matter, an attempt to
intervene in a suit after the entry of judgment and during a pending motion
for new trial, was not authorized, presumably even in the absence of a mo-
tion to strike the intervention. 146 Moreover, since the intervention was im-
permissible as a matter of law, the court reasoned that the intervenor never
became a party to the suit and any appeal taken by the intervenor had to be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 147
VIII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Amended rule 18b 148 significantly expands the grounds for recusal of
judges. Under the amended rule, judges are still required to recuse them-
selves in any proceeding 149 in which their impartibility might reasonably be
questioned.' 50 The rule also still requires recusal in instances where the
judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts or a personal bias
138. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(7); see Carlson, supra note 35, at 227; Doggett, supra note 108, at
145.
139. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(8); see Carlson, supra note 35, at 227; Doggett, supra note 108, at
146.
140. TEx. R. Civ. P. 60.
141. Id.
142. 793 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1990).
143. Id. at 657.
144. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 60.
145. 794 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
146. Id. at 603.
147. Id. at 604.
148. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b.
149. "Proceeding" is defined to include pretrial, trial or other stages of litigation. Id.
18b(4)(a).
150. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a).
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concerning the subject matter or a party."' In addition, a judge should now
recuse himself in any proceedings in which (1) he or a lawyer with whom he
previously practiced law has been a material witness;15 2 (2) he participated
as counsel, adviser or material witness in the matter in controversy, or ex-
pressed an opinion on the merits while acting as an attorney in government
service;' 5 3 (3) he or certain members of his immediate family have a financial
interest in the subject matter or a party, or any other interest that might be
affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 154 (4) he or other persons having
a certain relationship with him, as described in the rule, are witnesses or
parties to the proceedings, or are related to the parties or have an interest in
the proceedings in the manner set forth in the rule; 155 and (5) he, his spouse,
or a person within the first degree of relationship to either of them, or that
person's spouse, is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding. 156 The amended
rule also includes a definitional section which, among others, establishes de-
tailed guidelines as to what constitutes a "financial interest" for purposes of
the rule. 15 7 Rule 18b imposes a duty on the judge to inform himself about
his personal and fiduciary financial interests and to make a reasonable effort
to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and
minor children. 158 If a judge does not discover the existence of his or a
relative's financial or other interest that would require recusal until after he
has devoted substantial time to the matter, the rule does not require recusal
if the interest otherwise requiring recusal is divested. 159 In addition, the par-
ties to a proceeding may always waive any ground for recusal after such
ground is fully disclosed on the record.160
Although rule 18a' 61 escaped amendment during the survey period, at
least one court grappled with a perceived ambiguity in its language. In
Dunn v. County of Dallas ' 62 a divided panel of the Dallas court of appeals
reversed a summary judgment entered nearly one year after the trial judge
sent a letter communicating his intention to recuse himself from the case.163
Although the trial judge directed his letter to all parties, as well as the pre-
siding administrative judge of the district, neither party filed a written mo-
151. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(b).
152. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(c).
153. TEx. R. Civ. P. lgb(2)(d).
154. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(e).
155. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(f).
156. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(g). This last ground of recusal parallels the prohibition con-
tained in TEX. Gov'T. CODE ANN § 82.066 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (attorney may not appear
before judge in civil case related to him by affinity or consanguinity within the first degree).
157. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18b(4).
158. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18b(3).
159. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18b(6). The amendment allows divestiture as an alternative to
recusal when the grounds for recusal are those set forth in "subparagraphs (2)(e) or (2)(f)(iii),"
however, the latter reference is apparently a typographical error. The context of the rule sug-
gests that divestiture would be an appropriate alternative to recusal under the circumstances
described in subparagraph (2)(f)(ii), rather than (2)(f)(iii).
160. TEX. R. Cv. P. 18b(5).
161. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18a governs the procedure for disqualification or recusal of judges.
162. 794 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
163. Id. at 561.
1991]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tion under rule. 1 8a and the court did not assign another judge to handle the
case. Finding neither of these irregularities dispositive, i6 the court of ap-
peals held that the trial court's letter constituted an order of recusal valid
and effective at the time the judge signed it. 165 According to the court, rules
18a and 18b impose only two requirements on a judge electing to recuse
himself under either rule: (1) an order of recusal and (2) a request to the
administrative judge to assign a replacement judge for the proceeding. 166
The majority in Dunn concluded that the judge's letter satisfied both require-
ments because it constituted a clear and unequivocal act of the trial court,
not unlike many other acts of a court that are routinely communicated to the
parties either orally or by letter.167 Since rule 18a forbids any further action
by a trial judge after he signs an order of recusal, except for good cause, the
court of appeals determined that the trial court lacked power to enter the
summary judgment once the judge sent the letter of recusal 1 68
In J-IV Investments v. David Lynn Machine, Inc. 169 the Dallas court of
appeals followed a long line of Texas decisions and refused to require recusal
of a trial judge who accepted a campaign contribution from one of the par-
ties' counsel. Citing recent Texas decisions which refused to disqualify trial
judges in similar circumstances, 7 0 the court held that the trial judge had not
abused his discretion by deciding that the campaign contribution did not
create a bias mandating recusal. 71
IX. VENUE
Whitson v. Harris 172 addressed the interplay between jurisdictional and
venue statutes. The plaintiff in Whitson had sustained injuries ostensibly
covered by her group health insurance policy. By the time the plaintiff as-
serted her claim for benefits under the policy, however, her insurance carrier
was in receivership. The receiver denied the plaintiff's claim on the basis
that her injuries were not covered by the policy; the plaintiff then brought
suit in Gray County to collect the policy benefits. The receiver interposed a
164. The court observed that judges may voluntarily recuse themselves under TEX. R. Ov.
P. 18b(2), and no motion by either party is a prerequisite to the application of the rule. 794
S.W.2d at 562. The court further noted that the validity of an order is not affected by the fact
that further, incidental proceedings may be required to fully effectuate the order. Id. at 563.
Thus, the presiding judge's failure to assign a replacement judge did not operate in any way to
invalidate the "order" of recusal. Id.
165. Id. at 562.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 563; see TEX. R. Cv. P. 18a(c).
169. 784 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
170. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 842-45 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
171. 784 S.W.2d at 107-08.
172. 792 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
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plea of privilege, 73 arguing that section 3(h) of the Texas Insurance Code' 74
was a mandatory venue provision that required the suit to be brought in
Travis County, where the receivership was pending. The Gray County dis-
trict court sustained the receiver's plea and ordered the cause transferred to
Travis County. 175 The receiver then successfully moved for summary judg-
ment on the basis that section 3 (h) barred the plaintiff's claim because the
plaintiff had not filed the claim in Travis County within three months after
receiving the defendant's written notice rejecting the claim.
On appeal from the summary judgment, plaintiff contended that her suit
was timely since she commenced the action in Gray County within the three
month grace period specified by section 3(h). The court of appeals agreed,
holding that section 3(h) was merely a mandatory venue provision, and not a
statute circumscribing jurisdiction. 176 According to the court, the statute of
limitations is tolled whenever a plaintiff timely files a petition in a court
possessing subject matter jurisdiction, even if venue is not proper in that
court. 177 In dictum, the court acknowledged that a trial court order that
purports to transfer venue is void if a jurisdictional statute governs the
cause. 178 The court thereby implied that the plaintiff's initial filing in Gray
County would not have tolled the statute of limitations if section 3(h) were
jurisdictional.
Section 15.064(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that
improper venue is never harmless error and, as a consequence, is always
reversible error.179 According to the court in Flores v. Arrieta,80 however,
this rule does not mandate a reversal of a trial court's erroneous transfer of a
case unless venue is improper in the transferee court. In Flores, the appel-
lant contended that the trial court erred in transferring the case because
venue was proper in the county where appellant commenced her suit. Nev-
ertheless, the appellant conceded on appeal that venue was also proper in the
transferee court. Although the court held that the appellant failed to pre-
serve error by providing the court with the required record on appeal,' 8 ' it
173. Prior to their amendment in 1983, the rules of procedure governing venue hearings
provided for the filing of a "plea of privilege" as the procedural mechanism for challenging a
plaintiff's choice of venue. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 120a, 385, 527 (1983).
Complementing the legislature's 1983 overhaul of the Texas venue statute, Act of June 17,
1983, ch. 385, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119-2124 [now codified at TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 15.001-15.100 (Vernon 1986)], the Texas Supreme Court promulgated amended
procedural rules in 1983 that eliminated all references to the plea of privilege. See Order of
June 15, 1983, reprinted at 46 TEX. B.J. 858-59 (1983)(special tear-out section).
174. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.28, § 3(h) (Vernon Supp. 1990) provides that any action
on an insurance claim rejected by a receiver must be brought in the court in which the receiv-
ership proceeding is pending within three months after service of the receiver's written rejec-
tion notice.
175. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the district court's order sustaining the
receiver's plea of privilege. Whitson v. Harris, 682 S.W.2d 423, 426 (rex. App.-Amarillo
1984, no writ).
176. 792 S.W.2d at 209.
177. Id. at 210.
178. Id. at 208 (citing Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063, 1071 (1926)).
179. TEX. Civ. PRA C. & REM. CoDE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1990).
180. 790 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
181. Id. at 76-77.
1991]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
also noted in an alternative holding that appellant's concession directly con-
tradicted any finding under section 15.064(b) that venue was improper. 82
The Texas Supreme Court's recently enacted amendments to the rules of
civil procedure impacted the venue rules only slightly. The court amended
rule 87(3)(a)1a3 to clarify that a party is never required to supply proof of the
existence of a cause of action for venue purposes. Instead, the parties' plead-
ings are considered conclusive on the issue of whether a cause of action ex-
ists, and the parties' proof should be limited to venue facts.18 4
X. LIMITATIONS
The discovery rule provides that a statute of limitations will not start run-
ning until the plaintiff discovers the true facts giving rise to his claimed dam-
age or until the date the plaintiff should have reasonably discovered the facts
that establish the cause of action.' 8 5 Over the past two decades Texas courts
have steadily expanded the rule's coverage.' 8 6 In Moreno v. Sterling Drug,
Inc. 18 7 however, the Texas Supreme Court held that the discovery rule does
not apply in a wrongful death action. The appellants in Moreno were par-
ents of infants who died of Reye's Syndrome. In the days preceding the
deaths, the infants were administered doses of children's aspirin manufac-
tured by the appellee. The parents did not discover the connection between
aspirin and Reye's Syndrome until after the infants' deaths. By the time the
parents filed their actions against the drug manufacturer, more than two
years had expired since the infants' deaths.
The relevant limitations statute provided that a party suing for wrongful
death must bring his suit no later than two years after the death of the in-
jured person. 88 Responding to a certified question from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,'8 9 the court in Moreno held that the
discovery rule does not apply to this statute of limitations. 190 In reaching
this conclusion, the court observed that the discovery rule served as a judi-
cially constructed test used to determine when a plaintiff's cause of action
accrued in cases where the applicable statute of limitations was silent as to
182. Id. at 77.
183. TEx. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(a).
184. Id.
185. Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1972) (statute of limitations begins to run
from time of discovery of true facts or from date they should have been discovered using
ordinary care and diligence); Anderson v. Sneed, 615 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1981, no writ) (utilizing discovery rule to determine when cause of action accrued). See
generally Figari, Graves & Gordon, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36
Sw. L.J. 435, 450 (1982) (discussing discovery rule generally).
186. See, e.g., Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988) (legal malpractice); Kelley v.
Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. 1976)(filing false and libelous credit report); Gaddis v. Smith,
417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967) (foreign object left in body by surgeon); Atkins v. Crosland, 417
S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967) (negligent preparation of tax return by accountant).
187. 787 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1990).
188. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(b) (Vernon 1986).
189. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3-c(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991) confers jurisdiction on the Texas
Supreme Court to answer questions of state law certified from a federal appeals court.
190. 787 S.W.2d at 349.
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the date of accrual. 191 In contrast, the limitations statute for wrongful death
prescribes an absolute limitations period by stating expressly that the cause
of action accrues at the date of death.1 92 By specifying that date, the legisla-
ture foreclosed judicial application of the discovery rule, and the court could
not disregard the plain language of the statute or distort the function of the
discovery rule by employing it in these circumstances. 193
The court in Moreno also held that the statute of limitations for wrongful
death actions did not violate the open courts provision of the Texas Consti-
tution. 194 In order to establish an open courts violation, a litigant must
show that he possesses a well-recognized common-law cause of action that is
being arbitrarily or unreasonably restricted by statute. 195 If, however, com-
mon law does not recognize the cause of action, because the action itself is a
creature of statute, then the legislative restrictions placed on the cause of
action do not abridge the litigant's constitutional rights. 196 The court deter-
mined that the appellants failed to satisfy the first prong of the open courts
test because wrongful death actions did not exist at common law but owe
their existence to legislative enactments. 197
The Texas Supreme Court again focused its attention on the discovery
rule in Burns v. Thomas.198 The defendant in Burns, a lawyer facing a mal-
practice claim, obtained a summary judgment on the basis of limitations.
Although the court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, the supreme
court concluded that the defendant failed to establish by summary judgment
proof the date when the plaintiff first discovered, or should have discovered,
the existence of his cause of action.199 Reiterating a statement made the
previous year in Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc.,20° the court announced
that a defendant seeking summary judgment on the basis of limitations has
the burden of negating the discovery rule.20 1 The defendant had argued on
appeal that the discovery rule did not apply at all because the trial court
granted the summary judgment before the supreme court decided Willis v.
191. Id. at 351 (citing Weaver v. Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. 1977)).
192. 787 S.W.2d at 351; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(b) (Vernon 1986).
193. 787 S.W.2d at 354. The court also noted that it refused to engraft a discovery rule on
other statutes of limitation that were similarly absolute and specifically defined the date or
event which triggered "accrual." Id. at 353; see Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 710
S.W.2d 544, 546-48 (Tex. 1986); Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. 1985).
194. 787 S.W.2d at 349; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides "all courts shall be open, and
every person for an injury done him, and his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law."
195. 787 S.W.2d at 355; Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex. 1988).
196. 787 S.W.2d at 355.
197. Id. at 356; Witty v. American Gen. Distrib., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1987);
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.002 (Vernon 1986).
198. 786 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1990).
199. Id. at 267.
200. 769 S.W.2d 515, 518 n.2 (Tex. 1988). According to the court, the decision in Woods
effectively overruled the court's earlier holding in Smith v. Knight, 608 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.
1980), which placed the summary judgment burden on the party relying on the discovery rule.
786 S.W.2d at 267 n.2.
201. 786 S.W.2d at 267.
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Maverick.20 2 The supreme court rejected this argument, and pointed to the
general rule that its decisions are retrospective in operation.203
Three cases decided during the survey period considered the impact of
service of process and joinder of parties on the statute of limitations. In
Gant v. DeLeon 204 the supreme court held that the unexplained failure to
serve process on a defendant for more than three years established lack of
diligence as a matter of law.205 Accordingly, the date of service on the de-
fendant did not relate back to the date the plaintiff filed the suit. Therefore,
the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's suit even though plaintiff filed
his original petition within the applicable limitations period. 20 6 Similarly, in
Cothrum Drilling Co. v. Partee20 7 the Eastland court of appeals held a judg-
ment could not be entered against individual partner defendants who were
not served with citation within the limitations period.208 Although the part-
nership itself was timely served with process in the manner specified by stat-
ute,20 9 the court ruled that the statute did not authorize a judgment against
individual partners who had not been served before the limitation period
expired. 210 Finally, in Matthews Construction Co. v. Rosen211 the supreme
court held that the filing of suit against a corporation tolls limitations as to a
subsequent suit against the alter ego of that corporation.212 The court disre-
garded the usual rules of limitations, and drew a parallel to its earlier deci-
sion in Castleberry v. Branscum.213 In that case, the court disregarded the
usual rules concerning the separate nature of corporate entities, and held
that it could act in equity to disregard the usual rules of law in order to
avoid an unjust result.214 According to the court, similar considerations jus-
tified tolling the statute of limitations in a second suit against an alter ego
where it had prevented satisfaction of the judgment obtained against the cor-
porate defendant in the first suit.21 5
202. 760 S.W.2d 642 (rex. 1988). In Willis, the supreme court held for the first time that
the discovery rule applied to actions for legal malpractice. Id. at 645.
203. 786 S.W.2d at 267 n.1 (citing Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983)). The
court further observed that the discovery rule applied to the plaintiff's DTPA claims as well.
786 S.W.2d at 267; see TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 (Vernon 1987) (DTPA
claims must be brought within two years after either date of violation or the date on which
consumer discovered or should have discovered the violation).
204. 786 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. 1990).
205. Id. at 259.
206. Id. at 260; see Rigo Mfg. Co. v. Thomas, 458 S.W.2d 180, 182 (rex. 1970) (plaintiff
must not only file suit within the limitations period but must also use diligence to have the
defendant served).
207. 790 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ denied).
208. Id. at 800.
209. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.022 (Vernon 1986) states that citation
served on one member of a partnership authorizes a judgment against the partnership and the
partner actually served.
210. 790 S.W.2d at 800.
211. 796 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1990).
212. Id. at 693.
213. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
214. Id. at 271-273.
215. 796 S.W.2d at 693-94.
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Williams v. Khalaf 216 is probably the most significant of the many deci-
sions regarding limitations that the supreme court handed down during the
survey period. The issue in Williams, which the court acknowledged was
important to the jurisprudence of the entire state,2 17 was whether a four-
year, or a two-year statute of limitations governs causes of action for fraud.
Prior to 1979, it was well-settled that a two year statute of limitations218
applied to an action for damages based upon fraud or deceit.219 Although
the two-year statute did not expressly mention actions for fraud, the statute
applied to actions for debts not evidenced by a writing. Courts consistently
classified fraud as such a debt, at least for limitations purposes, due to the
historical development of fraud as a quasi-contractual cause of action
evolved from assumpsit.220 On the other hand, a four-year statute of limita-
tions governed actions for a debt evidenced by a writing.2' In 1979, how-
ever, the legislature amended the two statutes to eliminate the distinction
between debts evidenced by a writing and other debts, and included all ac-
tions for debt under the four-year statute.222 Although nothing in the legis-
lative history of the amending act suggested that the legislature intended the
limitations period for fraud to remain two years, 223 cases decided after 1979
routinely applied the two-year statute of limitations to causes of action for
fraud.224 Moreover, in several decisions involving other types of business
torts, the Texas Supreme Court decided that the two-year statute of limita-
tions still applied.3 5
Despite these prior decisions, the Williams court ruled that a four-year
statute of limitations now governs fraud actions due to the 1979 amend-
ments enacted by the legislature.2 6 In doing so, the court adhered to its
earlier classification of fraud as a debt for limitations purposes. The court
also concluded that the legislature was charged with knowledge of the
court's prior holdings regarding this classification when it elected in 1979 to
subject all debt actions to a four-year statute of limitations.2 7 The court
found no inconsistency between its decision in Williams and its earlier hold-
ings regarding other business torts because these latter causes of action, like
most other torts generally, evolved from the common law action for trespass
216. 802 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. 1990).
217. Id. at 138.
218. See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (codified as TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986).
219. Eg. Quinn v. Press, 135 Tex. 60, 64, 140 S.W.2d 438, 440 (1940).
220. 802 S.W.2d at 657.
221. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (1925) (codified as TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986)).
222. Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 716 § 2, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1768-69.
223. 802 S.W.2d at 657.
224. See Hurlbut v. Gulf Ati. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. 1987); Coastal
Distrib. Co. v. NKG Spark Plug Co., 779 F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
225. Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1988) (legal malpractice); Arnold v.
National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex. 1987) (breach of duty of good
faith and fair dealing); First Nat'l Bank v. Levine, 721 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1986) (unfair
competition).
226. 802 S.W.2d at 652.
227. Id. at 136.
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rather than assumpsit.228 The court distinguished its two post-1979 amend-
ment decisions that applied a two-year statute to fraud actions by observing
that the fraud occurred in each instance more than two years before the
legislative amendment and, therefore, the claims were already time-barred
by the date the legislature amended the limitations statute.229 Despite the
controversial nature of the Williams decision, the issue now appears settled,




In a return to the pre-1988 procedure, rules 167231 and 168232 have been
amended to require that interrogatories and requests for production, as well
as the responses thereto, be filed with the court.233 While deposition notices
still need not be filed, such notices must now identify any persons who will
attend the deposition other than the deponent, parties, spouses of parties,
and counsel. 234 Hopefully, this new requirement that notice be given, and
the concomitant opportunity to seek a protective order, will eliminate squab-
bles between counsel over attempts to invoke the rule23" in order to exclude
witnesses at depositions.
The Texas Supreme Court came down strongly in favor of a party's right
to videotape a deposition in Masinga v. Whittington.236 In Masinga, one of
the defendants obtained a protective order prohibiting the videotaping of his
deposition based solely on his unverified objection that it would be unneces-
sarily distracting and stressful to him. The supreme court held the trial
court abused its discretion in granting the protective order.237 The court
stated that, to avoid the videotaping of a deposition, a party must make a
factual showing of a "particular, specific, and demonstrable injury. ' 238 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Doggett elaborated on the role of videotaped
depositions in modem litigation and concluded that, at least with respect to
a witness who cannot be subpoenaed at trial, a trial court will almost always
commit an abuse of discretion in denying the right to videotape a
deposition. 239
228. Id. at 134-35.
229. Id. at 136.
230. See Spangler v. Jones, 797 S.W.2d 125, 132 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied)
(fraud governed by four-year statute).
231. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167.
232. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
233. TEx. R. Civ. P. 167(e); TEx. R. Civ. P. 168.
234. TEX. R. Civ. P. 200(2)(a); TEx. R. Civ. P. 208(1) (depositions upon written ques-
tions). If a party other than the party who noticed the deposition intends to have other per-
sons attend, that party too must give reasonable notice to all parties of the identity of those
persons. TEX. R. Civ. P. 200(2)(a); TEX. R. Civ. P. 208(1).
235. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 267; TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 614.
236. 792 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1990).
237. Id. at 940.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 943 (Doggett, J., concurring).
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Sherwood Lane Associates v. O'Neill24° addressed the issue of whether
mandamus relief is available to compel a psychiatric examination.2 1 A
Houston court of appeals concluded that fundamental fairness requires a
party to submit to a psychiatric examination if she has put her mental condi-
tion in issue and designated her own expert witness to testify to same.242
Thus, mandamus may compel a trial court to order the examination.' 43 Ac-
cording to the concurrence, however, the O'Neill holding does not mean that
the trial judge must order that the examination be conducted by an expert
chosen by the opposing party; if some valid objection to the opposing party's
expert exists, the judge has the discretion to appoint an independent
expert.2 "
While only a court order may compel a physical or mental examina-
tion,245 rule 166b(2)(h) 246 states that a party may obtain the medical records
of a party alleging physical or mental injury "upon written request." 247 In
Kentucky Fried Chicken National Management Co. v. Tennant 241 the same
Houston court of appeals held that such a request is not required to be in
any particular form and need not necessarily comply with the specificity re-
quirements of a Rule 167(l)(c) 249 document request.250
A trial court may permit a party to withdraw or amend deemed admis-
sions upon a showing of good cause, if the opposing party will not be unduly
prejudiced and the merits of the action will be subserved. 251 According to
the courts in Employers Insurance v. Halton252 and Boone v. Texas Employ-
ers' Insurance Association 253 a showing of inadvertence or oversight on the
part of the responding party may be sufficient to meet this good cause stan-
dard.2 54 In reaching this conclusion,255 both courts relied on case law inter-
preting the good cause requirement for setting aside default judgments under
rule 320.256 While the result appears to be reasonable, it stands in marked
contrast to the recent supreme court authority that stringently interprets the
240. 782 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding).
241. Efective September 1, 1990, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 167a provides for a court-
ordered examination of a party by a psychologist if that party has designated a psychologist as
an expert who will testify. This rule modifies the holding of Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d
749, 751 (Tex. 1988), that a party may not be required to submit to an examination by a
psychologist, as opposed to a psychiatrist, under old Rule 167a.
242. 782 S.W.2d at 945.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 945-46 (Dunn, J., concurring).
245. TEx. R. Civ. P. 167a.
246. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(h).
247. Id.
248. 782 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding).
249. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(l)(c).
250. Tennant, 782 S.W.2d at 320.
251. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(2).
252. 792 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
253. 790 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ).
254. Halton, 792 S.W.2d at 466-67; Boone, 790 S.W.2d at 688-89.
255. Halton, 792 S.W.2d at 465-66; Boone, 790 S.W.2d at 689.
256. TEX. P Civ. P. 320; see generally Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex.
388, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939)(unavailablility of personnel responsible to defend was proper
ground for setting aside default judgment).
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good cause standard in the area of supplementation of discovery
responses.257
B. Privileges and Exemptions
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the scope of the exemption from dis-
covery for consulting experts during the survey period, by amending the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and rendering decisions in two mandamus
proceedings. Under new rule 166b(3)(b), 258 the identity and opinions of a
consulting expert are discoverable if reviewed by a testifying expert.259 Ac-
cordingly, trial courts will not have to decide, as required under the former
rule,260 whether the consulting expert's work product formed a basis, in
whole or in part, of the testifyring expert's opinions. 261
In Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany262 the supreme court answered several ques-
tions regarding the scope of the consulting expert privilege, yet may also
have raised a number of new questions. The court held that a party may not
shield from discovery the factual knowledge and opinions of a participant in
the events underlying a lawsuit merely by designating that person as a con-
sulting-only expert.263 The soundness of this general proposition is evident
under the facts of Axelson.
The defendants in a gas well blowout case attempted to designate the pe-
troleum engineer in charge of the well from its inception as a consulting
expert. The plaintiff's protested such a designation would prevent them
from inquiring into the engineer's mental impressions and opinions as a first-
hand observer. The supreme court noted the consulting expert exemption
extends only to one who has been informally consulted or specially em-
ployed in anticipation of litigation.264 Thus, employees with knowledge by
virtue of first-hand involvement in the incident giving rise to the litigation
cannot qualify as consulting-only experts because the consultation was not
their only source of information.265 The court left open the possibility that a
party may utilize its own employee as a consulting expert in litigation, pro-
vided that person did not work in the area that became the subject of the
litigation, but was reassigned specifically to assist the employer in anticipa-
tion of the litigation.266
In addition to explaining the status of these so-called dual capacity wit-
nesses, the Axelson court held that the consulting expert exemption protects
from discovery only the identity, mental impressions, and opinions of con-
suiting-only experts, but not the facts known to such experts.26' The opin-
257. See infra notes 302-25 and accompanying text.
258. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(b).
259. Id.
260. TEx. R. CIv. P. 166b(3)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
261. Id.
262. 798 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1990).
263. Id. at 554.
264. Id. at 554-55.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 555.
267. Id. at 554 n.8.
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ion is unclear whether the court also intended these statements to apply to
the paradigmatic consulting-only expert, without the dual capacity wrinkle
at issue in Axelson.268 If so, then the trial practitioner faces many new issues
in selecting and utilizing consulting experts. For example, if a consulting-
only expert prepares a written report for counsel, must the trial court parse
the report to segregate what constitutes factual information and what consti-
tutes mental impressions and opinions so as to order production of the for-
mer category? Indeed, does the bright line between facts and opinions that
the supreme court seems to be drawing even exist, especially in the case of a
consulting expert who does her own testing, analysis, or examination as part
of the consultation? Moreover, a broad reading of Axelson suggests that if a
party fortuitously discovers the identity of the opposition's consulting ex-
pert, that party is entitled to discover the facts known to the expert through
deposition as opposed to an interrogatory seeking disclosure of all material
facts. Until future resolution of these and other questions, the practitioner
should exercise caution when using consulting experts.
In another consulting expert decision during the survey period, Scott, Inc.
v. McIlhany269 the Supreme Court of Texas disallowed an attempt to redes-
ignate certain experts from testifying experts to consulting-only experts. 270
The defendants in Scott, through a settlement with certain of the plaintiffs,
had gained control of those plaintiffs' expert witnesses who were prepared to
give testimony damaging to the defendants. The plaintiffs and defendants
redesignated the experts as consulting only. Upon the application of the
remaining plaintiffs for mandamus relief, the supreme court held that the
redesignation of experts under these facts violated the policy underlying the
rules of discovery.27' The court held that disputes should be decided by the
facts that are revealed rather than concealed. 272 Thus, the redesignation was
ineffective.2 "3 A contrary holding, said the court, would do nothing to
"'preclude a party in a multi-party case from in effect auctioning off a wit-
ness' testimony to the highest bidder.' "274
In Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals275 the supreme court held that a
party could not rely on the psychotherapist-patient privilege276 offensively,
after affirmatively invoking the jurisdiction of the court, to shield relevant
information from discovery.2 77 Two cases decided during the survey period
268. Compare Id. at 58 ("The rule we announce today, however, 'should not extend to
consulting [only] experts... whose only source of factual information was the consultation.' ")
(citing Barrow & Henderson, 1984 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Affecting
Discovery, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 713, 729 (1984)), with Axelson, 798 S.W.2d 555 ("In any event,
a party may discover facts known by an employee acting as a 'consulting-only' expert.").
269. 798 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1990).
270. Id. at 560.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 559.
273. Id. at 559-60.
274. Id. at 559 (quoting Williamson v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. Rptr. 39, 45, 582 P.2d 126,
132 (1978)).
275. 686 S.W.2d 105 (rex. 1985).
276. TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 510.
277. Ginsberg, 686 S.W.2d at 107-08.
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reached opposite conclusions regarding the application of the Ginsberg
sword/shield distinction to claims of attorney-client privilege.
In Parten v. Brigham 278 the plaintiff brought a bill of review and suit for
partition, alleging she was defrauded into agreeing to a consent divorce de-
cree as a result of her husband's concealment of community assets.279 Rely-
ing on Ginsberg, the court prohibited the plaintiff from asserting the
attorney-client privilege with respect to communications with her attorney
regarding the community estate.280 While noting that the filing of a lawsuit
rarely affects the validity of a claim of attorney-client privilege, 28' the court
concluded that under these facts the plaintiff's assertion of the privilege con-
stituted an impermissible offensive use.28 2
Cantrell v. Johnson,283 on the other hand, presented a more typical exam-
ple of a plaintiff's invocation of the attorney-client privilege. The defendant
in Cantrell requested all documents reflecting communications between the
plaintiff and his attorney relating to several agreements at issue in the suit.
The court held these documents were not discoverable. 284 Although the
trial court based its decision on a number of factors, including an express
finding both that the plaintiff had not waived the privilege and the withheld
documents were not relevant, 28 5 the court of appeals indicated its doubt that
the attorney-client privilege could ever be abrogated under a Ginsberg
analysis.28 6
Finally, two decisions of note discussed the attorney work product doc-
trine during the survey period. The court in Wood v. McCown 287 while ac-
knowledging that the exemption from discovery for work product developed
in a civil case normally terminates at the end of that case, 288 nevertheless
refused to compel the production in a civil action of the work product of the
attorney who represented the defendant in an already concluded criminal
prosecution.289 In Leede Oil & Gas, Inc. v. McCorkle290 the court held that
the work product doctrine did not prohibit the trial judge from ordering the
production of excerpts from three documents prepared by the plaintiff's at-
torneys relating to conferences with a deceased witness. 291 In doing so, how-
ever, the court noted that the portions of the documents to be produced did
278. 785 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, orig. proceeding).
279. Id. at 166.
280. Id. at 167-68.
281. Id. at 168.
282. Id.
283. 785 S.W.2d at 185 (Tex. App.-Waco 1990, orig. proceeding).
284. Id. at 189-90.
285. Id. at 189.
286. Id. at 190. ("The Ginsberg holding must be limited to the facts of that case and does
not control the disposition of this matter. Ginsberg has never been applied to the attor-
ney/client privilege by the Texas Supreme Court.").
287. 784 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, orig. proceeding).
288. Id. at 128-29; see also Eddington v. Touchy, 793 S.W.2d 335, 336-37 (Tex. App.-
Houston (Ist Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding) ("none of the investigative privileges protect docu-
ments from discovery in litigation separate from the 'pending litigation.' ").
289. McCown, 784 S.W.2d at 129.
290. 789 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
291. Id. at 687.
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not give any indication of the mental impressions, opinions, or trial strategy
of plaintiff's attorneys.292
C. Procedure for Claiming Privilege or Exemption
The 1990 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure further clari-
fied the procedure for the presentation of objections during discovery and
essentially codified the supreme court's decision in McKinney v. National
Union FYre Insurance Co.293 a case discussed in the 1990 Annual Survey.
Rule 166b(4)294 now expressly provides that an objection or motion for pro-
tective order made by a party to discovery is sufficient to preserve that objec-
tion, and the objecting party does not waive the objection by failing to obtain
a ruling thereon prior to trial.2 95 In addition, the new rule includes a re-
quirement that affidavits offered to support an objection based on any ex-
emption or immunity from discovery be served at least seven days before the
hearing on such objection. 296
Despite the great increase in the number of mandamus actions involving
discovery matters in recent years, the supreme court reminded the bench
and bar in Pope v. Stephenson 297 that the decision not to pursue that ex-
traordinary remedy does not prejudice or waive a party's right to complain
of an error in the pre-trial process on appeal.298 If the appeal route is cho-
sen, the complaining party must show that error was harmful and must,
therefore, ensure that any in camera documents are brought forward to the
court of appeals. 299
Green v. Lerner3°° is another case of interest to the trial practitioner. In
Green, the relator argued that the objecting party waived any claim of privi-
lege by failing to identify in its motion for protective order each specific
document allegedly exempt from discovery. While the court agreed that
rule 166b(4) 30 1 requires a party to plead specifically the particular exemption
or immunity relied upon, the court rejected the relator's contention that an
objection to production requires a listing of each of the documents
withheld.302
292. Id.
293. 772 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. 1989).
294. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(4).
295. Id. The supreme court's original amendment to rule 166b(4) contained a caveat that a
party could not utilize at trial any matter withheld from discovery pursuant to an objection or
motion for protective order, whether ruled upon or not. See Changes to Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Texas Rules of Evidence, 53 Tax. B.J. 589,
597 (1990). This provision quickly came under criticism, and was deleted (retroactively to
September 1, 1990) by an order of the supreme court dated September 4, 1990.
296. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(4).
297. 787 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1990).
298. Id. at 954 n. 1, (disapproving Caudillo v. Chiuminatto, 741 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ)).
299. 787 S.W.2d at 954.
300. 786 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding).
301. Tax. R. Civ. P. 166b(4).
302. 786 S.W.2d at 489.
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D. Duty to Supplement Discovery
Numerous decisions during the survey period focused on the duty to sup-
plement discovery responses imposed by Rules 166b(6)30 3 and 215(5).30 4
Sharp v. Broadway National Bank 305 evidences that, as in prior years, the
supreme court was out in front of the intermediate appellate courts in urging
the strict enforcement of the exclusionary sanction against those who fail to
supplement timely. In Sharp, the trial court permitted the plaintiff to offer
the testimony of two expert witnesses on the issue of attorney's fees. The
plaintiff, however, had failed to identify either witness in response to the
defendants' interrogatories.
The plaintiff argued that the good cause exception to rule 215(5)306 had
been met because (1) the parties had orally identified the attorney's fee ex-
perts more than once in advance of trial, (2) defendants' counsel knew the
only trial issue was attorney's fees, (3) the parties had deposed one of the
experts, and (4) the failure to supplement was inadvertent. The supreme
court held that these explanations, either individually or taken together, did
not establish good cause to allow the witnesses' testimony. 30 7 While the
supreme court has clearly enunciated a stringent good cause standard, such
standard is not insurmountable. For example, in Stevenson v. Koutzarov308
the court found that good cause existed to allow an undisclosed witness to
testify where the offering parties asserted they did not know they would need
the witness' testimony until the opposing party amended his pleadings ten
days prior to trial.30 9
Courts continued to struggle during the survey period with the issue of
what types of witnesses must be identified in response to an interrogatory
asking for the identity of persons with knowledge of relevant facts. In
Jamail v. Anchor Mortgage Services, Inc.310 the appellate court held the trial
court did not err in allowing the defendant's corporate representative, who
was not identified in its interrogatory answers, to testify generally with re-
spect to lending regulations because he was not a person with "'knowledge
of facts relevant to this cause of action.' "1311 Conversely, in Orkin Extermi-
nating Co. v. Williamson 312 the same court upheld the exclusion of the testi-
mony of a records custodian who had not been identified as a person having
knowledge of relevant facts.313
303. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6).
304. TEX. R. COv. P. 215(5).
305. 784 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1990)(per curiam).
306. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5).
307. Sharp, 784 S.W.2d at 671-72. See also Stiles v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 798 S.W.2d
591, 596 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (letter to opposing counsel insufficient to iden-
tify witness).
308. 795 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
309. Id. at 318.
310. 797 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
311. Id. at 375.
312. 785 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
313. Id. at 910-11. The court also expressed some disagreement with the characterization
of the proffered witness as merely a records custodian. Id. at 910.
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Perhaps the most intriguing issue in the supplementation of discovery an-
swers area, however, is whether the exclusionary sanction should be applied
to a party who forgets to designate himself as a person with knowledge of
relevant facts. In Volunteer Council of Denton State School, Inc. v. Berry314
the Dallas court of appeals assumed, without deciding, that a party should
be precluded from offering her own testimony at trial where she was not
identified in response to interrogatories. 315 One Houston court of appeals
has taken the contrary position, however, in NCL Studs, Inc v. Jand1316 and
Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum.3 17 Both cases hold that when a party fails to
identify himself as a witness, such party may testify even if he cannot show
good cause. 318 Finally, the one court that has considered the issue con-
cluded that a party always has the right to examine the opposing party at
trial, irrespective of whether the opponent was identified as a person with
knowledge in the offering party's interrogatory answers.319
Rule 166b(6) 320 requires a party to identify its expert witnesses as soon as
is practical, but in no event later than thirty days before trial.3 21 The first
half of this requirement has received scant attention in the reported case law.
The San Antonio court of appeals, however, held that the requirement vests
the trial court with the discretion to determine whether a party used due
diligence in seeking out and identifying its experts.322 The Tyler court of
appeals recently rejected this interpretation of the practical notification stan-
dard in Mother Frances Hospital v. Coats.323 The Tyler court held that, in
the absence of a specific order, a party is not required to seek out its experts
at any particular time prior to trial.324 The court did, however, use the as
soon as is practical test to exclude expert testimony which the defendants




Rule 215(3)326 was amended in 1990 to provide explicitly that sanctions
for abuse of the discovery process may only be imposed after notice and
hearing.327 In Brighton Square Publishing, Inc. v. Nelson 328 the court re-
314. 795 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
315. Id. at 234-35.
316. 792 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
317. 797 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, no writ).
318. Id. at 57-58; Jandl, 792 S.W.2d at 186.
319. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Terry, 794 S.W.2d 63, 65-6 (1'ex. App.-Texarkana 1990,
writ denied).
320. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(6).
321. Id.
322. Builder's Equip. Co. v. Onion, 713 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986,
orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
323. 796 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding).
324. Id. at 570-7 1.
325. Id. at 571.
326. TEx. R. Civ. P. 215(3).
327. Id. The amendment to rule 215(3) also makes it clear that any sanction imposed be
"appropriate."
328. 795 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
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versed a default judgment entered as a sanction under rule 215(2)(b)(5) 329
because the record did not affirmatively show that the trial court afforded
the offending party an opportunity to be heard on the motion for sanc-
tions.330 The court refused to consider the movant's argument that the fail-
ure to seek a hearing operated as a waiver of the right to one under the trial
court's local rules, since the movant did not provide the court with compe-
tent proof of the content of such local rules. 331
Rule 215332 grants trial judges broad discretion to impose a variety of
sanctions against a party for discovery abuses. 333 In Lehtonen v. Clarke,334
however, the Houston court of appeals held that a trial judge may not im-
pose a sanction that is not expressly authorized by that rule.335 Specifically,
the court concluded that rule 215(2)(b)(5), 336 which authorizes the entry of
an order striking pleadings as a sanction, did not empower the trial court to
strike a motion for new trial as a sanction for a party's failure to answer
post-judgment interrogatories. 337
During the survey period, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals apparently
wrote the last chapter in the sanction proceedings engendered by a litigant's
attempt to depose Sam Walton, chairman of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. This
story left off in the 1990 Annual Survey with the court refusing to rule in a
mandamus proceeding on the propriety of the multi-million dollar sanctions
being assessed against Wal-Mart, because an adequate remedy was available
on appeal. In Carrizales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.338 the plaintiff appealed
after the newly-elected trial judge withdrew the 11.55 million dollar sanction
his predecessor had levied against Wal-Mart. The court of appeals con-
cluded that the new judge had an absolute right to withdraw the sanction
order during the period in which he retained plenary jurisdiction over the
case.339
XII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Texas Supreme Court added a new paragraph to rule 166a340 during
the survey period, which clarifies the procedure for presenting summary
judgment evidence to the trial court. Rule 166a(d)341 now expressly pro-
vides that a court may use unfiled discovery as summary judgment evidence
if the party relying upon such discovery files and serves on all parties (1)
329. TEx. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b)(5).
330. Nelon, 795 S.W.2d at 31-32.
331. Id. at 31.
332. TEx. R. Cv. P. 215.
333. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986).
334. 784 S.W.2d 945 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
335. Id. at 947-48.
336. TEx. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b)(5).
37. Clarke, 784 S.W.2d at 947.
338. 794 S.W.2d 129 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
339. Id. at 130.
340. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a.
341. Tax R. Civ. P. 166a(d).
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either an appendix containing the discovery materials or a notice containing
specific references to such materials, and (2) a statement of intent to use the
specified discovery as summary judgment proof.342 The timetable for filing
these materials is the same as for the filing of the motion and response,
twenty-one and seven days, respectively. 343 At least two Texas courts held
prior to the passage of this new rule that, in order to rely upon copies of
deposition excerpts as summary judgment evidence, such copies must be
properly authenticated by affidavit. 3 " The rule is unclear as to whether the
new procedure under rule 166a(d)345 obviates this requirement. 346
A number of courts during the survey period addressed the sufficiency of
summary judgment affidavits, and whether and how a party must object to
them. In Grand Prairie Independent School District v. Vaughan347 the
supreme court held that the failure to object to a summary judgment affida-
vit on the ground that such affidavit did not reflect it was made on personal
knowledge resulted in a waiver of that complaint on appeal.348 Conversely,
the absence of a jurat on an affidavit constituted a substantive, rather than
formal, defect in Tucker v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 349 Therefore, the party did
not waive the complaint on appeal by failing to bring it to the trial court's
attention.350 The court in El Paso Associates, Ltd. v. J. R. Thurman & Co.35 1
held that, if an objection is required, such objection must be in writing.352
Finally, in Connor v. Waltr'p353 the court concluded that, as long as a sum-
mary judgment affidavit is based on personal knowledge, the afliant need not
specifically state that the facts set forth are true.354
Texas courts during the survey period also addressed attendance at a sum-
mary judgment hearing. In Lee v. Braeburn Valley West Civic Association 355
342. Id.
343. TEx. R. Cirv. P. 166a(c).
344. See Mendez v. International Playtex, Inc., 776 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, writ denied); Deerfield Land Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty Co., 758
S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
345. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166a(d).
346. Interestingly, the Dallas court of appeals, which first announced the two-step proce-
dure for the use of deposition excerpts in Deerfield, whereby the copied pages of the deposition
are authenticated by the attorney's affidavit and the court reporter's certificate attests to the
accuracy of the transcription, recently held that the failure to include the attorney's affidavit
was not fatal. Deer Creek Ltd. v. North Am. Mortgage Co., 792 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, no writ). The court stated that Deerfield merely announced a suggested
method for authenticating deposition excerpts, rather than dictating an exclusive method. Id.
The Corpus Christi court of appeals, on the other hand, has taken the position that both steps
of the authentication process are required when copies of deposition excerpts are submitted.
Kotzur v. Kelly, 791 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). Moreover,
Kelly went on to hold that the opposing party did not waive its right to complain of the lack of
the attorney's affidavit on appeal by failing to object in the trial court. Id. at 256-57.
347. 792 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1990)(per curiam).
348. Id. at 945.
349. 787 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
350. Id. at 557.
351. 786 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1990, no writ).
352. Id. at 19.
353. 791 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
354. Id. at 539.
355. 786 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1990).
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the supreme court held that the defendant was required to file a motion for
new trial in order to raise his absence from the summary judgment hearing
as an issue on appeal. 356 A motion for new trial was not necessary to pre-
serve the defendant's other complaints regarding the summary judgment,
however, and his failure to include them in the motion for new trial was,
therefore, irrelevant. 357
In Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co. 358 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
held that a state prisoner was not denied his right of access to the courts as a
result of having been refused permission to attend the hearing on a motion
for summary judgment filed against him.359 In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied upon the fact that the trial court took the prisoner's written brief
into account. In addition, the court noted Rule 166a's 36° prohibition against
the introduction of oral testimony at a summary judgment hearing. 36'
XIII. JURY QUESTIONS
During the survey period, the Texas Supreme Court continued to ex-
hort 362 trial courts to follow the mandate of Texas Rule of Civil Procedural
277363 that jury cases be submitted upon broad form questions whenever
feasible.364 In Texas Department of Human Services v. E.B. 365 the supreme
court reversed a court of appeals decision that had found fault with a broad
form submission in a suit to terminate the parent-child relationship.366 The
court of appeals specifically held as defective the trial court's charge, which
asked simply if the parent-child relationship should be terminated, because
the applicable statute required the state to establish by clear and convincing
evidence one or more specified grounds for termination.367 Since the state
relied upon two possible grounds for termination, the court of appeals held it
was impossible to determine from the record if the state discharged its bur-
den of convincing at least ten jurors that one particular ground existed. 368
The supreme court disagreed with this analysis. In its original opinion in
the case, the court stated that the "'five jurors this/five jurors that' argu-
ment" could have been handled by an instruction. 369 On rehearing, the
356. Id. at 263.
357. Id.
358. 793 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 1990, writ denied).
359. Id. at 330-31.
360. TEX R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
361. 793 S.W.2d at 330-31.
362. See Figari, Dwyer & Colleluori, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
44 Sw. L.J. 541, 573-75 (1990).
363. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
364. Id.
365. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 596 (June 20, 1990), opinion on rehearing, 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.
1990).
366. 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990). The 1990 Annual Survey discussed the court of
appeals opinion, E.B. v. Texas Dep't of Human Services, 766 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Austin
1989), rev'd, 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990).
367. 766 S.W.2d at 388-90.
368. Id. at 390.
369. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 598.
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court reaffirmed its holding that the trial court's broad form submission was
proper, but deleted the reference to an explanatory instruction. 370 In its
place, the court stated that the controlling issue was whether the parent-
child relationship should be terminated, not what specific ground or grounds
supported the termination.371
Two noteworthy decisions during the survey period examined the propri-
ety of a trial judge's instructions to a jury. The first, American Bankers In-
surance Co. v. Caruth,372 arose from a trial on the issue of additional
damages held after the trial court entered a default judgment as to liability
and liquidated damages against the defendant as a discovery sanction. The
trial court's charge to the jury included thirty-six paragraphs of "Findings of
Fact", which essentially set out the various allegations that had been estab-
lished against the defendant by virtue of the default judgment. The court of
appeals concluded that the inclusion of these recitations constituted an im-
permissible comment on the weight of the evidence.373 While a trial judge
may assume uncontroverted facts in charging the jury, the information pro-
vided in the Caruth charge was not designed to assist the jury in answering
any question. The information instead implied that the judge thought that
the law and facts favored the plaintiffs and that they should be compensated
commensurately. 374
A trial court's instructions and refusal to release a deadlocked jury consti-
tuted reversible error in Shaw v. Greater Houston Transportation Co. 375 The
Shaw jury announced on three occasions, with increasing emphasis each
time, that they were at an impasse on the issue of damages. Rather than
dismiss the jury, however, the trial judge made a number of statements in the
nature of a so-called "dynamite" charge. The court of appeals found these
statements to be coercive because they clearly indicated that the judge would
not allow a hung jury.376
XIV. JURY PRACTICE
In Batson v. Kentucky 377 the United States Supreme Court held that the
prosecution in a criminal case may be required to provide a racially neutral
explanation to justify its use of peremptory strikes if the defendant estab-
lishes a prima facie case of discrimination. 378 During the survey period, the
Fifth Circuit and two Texas courts of appeals held that Batson is inapplica-
ble to civil litigation. 379 Each of these decisions rationalized that, unlike a
370. 802 S.W.2d at 648.49.
371. Id.
372. 786 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
373. Id. at 435.
374. Id.
375. 791 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
376. Id. at 209.
377. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
378. Id. at 92-94.
379. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990)(en banc);
Texas Health Enter., Inc. v. Tolden, 795 S.W.2d 17, 18-19 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ);
Powers v. Palacios, 794 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
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criminal prosecution, a civil lawsuit does not involve state action.380 In con-
trast, in CEJ v. State,381 the Dallas court of appeals extended Batson to juve-
nile delinquency trials, which, while classified as civil proceedings, are quasi-
criminal in nature.382
Employers Insurance v. Horton38 3 discussed the constitutional right to a
jury trial.38 4 As the result of scheduling difficulties, the trial court required
the parties, over the defendant's objection, to complete their presentations in
one day and further required the jury to begin deliberations late that same
evening. The defendant argued that the court did not provide a meaningful
trial since the defendant had to present its evidence in the evening hours to a
weary jury. While the court of appeals disfavored the practice of holding
juries for long periods of time without recess, the appellate court neverthe-
less found no violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a trial by
jury.38 5
In order to obtain a jury trial in Texas, a litigant must request a jury trial
and deposit the appropriate jury fee. 386 The decision in Forscan Corp. v.
Dresser Industries, Inc. 38 7 should serve as a reminder to trial practitioners
that both an express demand and the payment of the fee are essential. In
Forscan, defendants' counsel sent a letter to the district clerk and enclosed a
check that the letter described as representing the jury fee. The appeals
court held the trial court properly removed the case from the jury docket
because the defendants' cover letter did not represent a sufficient request for
a jury.388
Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Guerrero38 9 involved an inter-
esting claim of improper jury argument. The appeals court held that refer-
ences by plaintiff's counsel to unity in his closing argument constituted an
impermissible (and incurable) appeal for ethnic solidarity, since the plaintiff,
his attorney, his treating physician, and eleven of the twelve jurors had Span-
ish surnames.390 Although the court acknowledged that the ethnic refer-
ences it perceived in Guerrero were "veiled and subtle" in comparison to
other cases which appealed on the basis of racial prejudice, the court never-
theless concluded that Texas courts must condemn sophisticated arguments
of such a nature as readily as those that are open and unabashed. 391
380. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 221-22; Tolden, 795 S.W.2d at 18-19; Powers, 794 S.W.2d at
495.
381. 788 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
382. Id. at 852.
383. 797 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ).
384. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 15; art. V, § 10.
385. 797 S.W.2d at 682.
386. TEx. R. Civ. P. 216(a), (b).
387. 789 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
388. Id. at 392.
389. 800 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
390. Id. at 862. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Biery took issue with, among others, the
majority's conclusion that these facts alone could give rise to any inference that plaintiff's
counsel was attempting to appeal to a sense of ethnic unity among the jurors. Id. at 870.
391. Id. at 866.
[Vol. 45
CIVIL PROCEDURE
XV. JUDGMENT, DISMISSAL, AND MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
Pursuant to the recent amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule 301392 now provides that every judgment shall be set forth in a separate,
written document signed by the judge, and that a judgment is not rendered
until it is signed by the judge.393 In addition, rule 305394 was amended to
allow any party, rather than only the prevailing party, to prepare a form of
judgment and submit it to the court.3 95
The 1990 amendments also changed the timetable and procedure for filing
requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rule 296396 now pro-
vides that, in any non-jury case, a "Request for Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law" shall be filed with the clerk of the court within twenty days
after the judgment is signed.397 The clerk has a duty to immediately call the
request to the attention of the judge who tried the case.398 The court then
has twenty days from the date the request is filed to file its findings and
conclusions. 399 If the court fails to fie such findings timely, the party mak-
ing the request may file within thirty days after the filing of the original
request a "Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,"
which the clerk is again obliged to call immediately to the court's attention.
The court's time to file its findings and conclusions is then extended an addi-
tional twenty days53 ° Apparently, this new procedure relieves the request-
ing party of the somewhat ambiguous obligation imposed under old Rule
297 of calling the court's attention to its failure to file timely findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
Any party may ifie requests for additional or amended findings or conclu-
sions within ten days after the court's filing of the original findings and con-
clusions.4° 1 The court may then fie any additional or amended findings or
conclusions it deems appropriate within ten days.4 °2 Nothing, however, will
be deemed or presumed by the court's failure to make additional findings or
conclusions. 4° 3 Finally, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a)(1) 404 has
also been amended to extend a party's time to ninety days in order to perfect
an appeal in non-jury cases in which such party has filed a timely request for
findings of fact and conclusions of law.4° 5
392. TEx. R. Cv. P. 301.
393. Id. A new rule 299a has also been added. Rule 299a provides that findings of fact
shall not be recited in a judgment, and if any finding erroneously contained in a judgment
conflicts with a finding of fact made pursuant to rules 297 and 298, the latter shall control for
appellate purposes. TEx. R. Ctv. P. 299a.
394. TEx. R. Civ. P. 305.
395. Id.
396. Tax. R. Civ. P. 296.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Tax. R. Civ. P. 297.
400. Id.
401. TEX. IL Civ. P. 298.
402. Id.
403. Id.




In Rogers v. Clinton40 6 the Texas Supreme Court held a defendant has an
absolute right to withdraw a motion for new trial at any time before it is
heard. 40 7 The attorneys retained by the defendant's insurer filed a motion
for new trial to set aside a default judgment that the court entered against
the defendant. While this motion was pending, the defendant settled with
the plaintiffs by, among other things, assigning to them any claims he had
against his insurer. Moreover, just twenty minutes before the court was to
hear the motion for new trial, the defendant filed a notice that he was dis-
charging the attorneys hired by his insurer and withdrawing his motion for
new trial. The trial court nevertheless heard the motion and set aside the
default judgment, and both the plaintiffs and defendant sought mandamus
relief.
In a five to four decision, the supreme court held that the district court
exceeded its lawful authority and abused its discretion in granting the mo-
tion for a new trial.408 The court rejected the insurer's argument that, once
a motion for new trial under rule 329b 4w is timely filed, the trial court's
plenary jurisdiction over its judgment is extended beyond thirty days even if
a party subsequently withdraws the motion.410 Instead, the court analogized
a defendant's right to withdraw a motion for new trial to a plaintiff's abso-
lute right to nonsuit a case.41"
XVI. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A. Rule Amendments
The Texas Supreme Court amended more than forty of the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure effective September 1, 1990. Although some of these
changes were merely cosmetic, and a full discussion of each of the amended
rules is beyond the scope of this survey, many amendments merit discussion
due to their significance to the appellate practitioner.
1. Service
Rule 4, as amended, expressly permits parties to serve each other by tele-
phonic document transfer.412 Service by fax is complete, however, only
406. 794 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. 1990).
407. Id. at 11.
408. Id.
409. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
410. 794 S.W.2d at 11. In a sharp dissent, Justice Cook disputed the majority's interpreta-
tion of rule 329b, instead finding within it a clear indication that the trial court retains plenaryjurisdiction for a period of thirty days following any form of disposition of a timely motion for
new trial. Id. at 12-14 (Cook, J., dissenting). Although Justice Cook agreed with the salutory
principle of encouraging settlements, which he perceived the majority was focusing upon, he
argued that the parties were not free to bargain with the trial court's judgment at a time when
the court still had plenary power. Id. at 13.
411. Id. at 11.
412. TEX. R. App. P. 4(f). Similarly, the court amended the counterpart rule governing
service in the trial court. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a. The amended appellate rule does not
include any provision, however, for filing papers with the appellate court by fax.
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upon receipt.413 The amended rule also obligates each attorney filing papers
with an appellate court to include his telecopier number, if any, along with
other required identifying information.414 Prior to its amendment, another
section of rule 4 required a filing by mail to be sent at least one day before
the filing deadline.415 Under the amended rule, an appellate filing made by
mail will now be deemed timely if it is deposited in the mail on or before the
last day for filing and received by the clerk not more than ten days after the
filing deadline. 416 Finally, the supreme court modified a number of other
appellate rules to require service of all appellate filings, except the record, on
every party to the trial court's judgment, because the interests of a non-
appealing party may be affected by another party's appeal.417 For the same
reason, appellate court clerks are now required to mail notices and copies of
all appellate court orders and opinions to each of the parties to the trial
court's judgment.41 8
2. Timetables on Appeal
Rules 41 and 54 have been amended to conform the appellate timetables
for jury and nonjury cases.419 In a nonjury case, the appeal bond is now due
within ninety days after the judgment is signed if any party has timely filed a
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.420 In these circum-
stances, the transcript and statement of facts, if any, must be filed within 120
days after the judgment.421 The amendments to rules 51 and 53, on the
other hand, make clear that a timely request for preparation of the record is
not a prerequisite to the court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction.422 The
court will still accept a transcript or statement of facts tendered within the
time specified by rule 54(a),423 even if a party fails to timely request prepara-
tion of the statement of facts or to file his designation of matters to be in-
cluded in the transcript.424 In the latter situation, however, the failure of the
clerk to include matters in the transcript that the dilatory party did not
timely designate will not be grounds for complaint on appeal.425
Several rule amendments involve the filing of motions for rehearing in the
courts of appeal, and their impact on the deadline for an application for writ
413. TEX. R. APP. P. 4(f).
414. TEX. R. App. P. 4(a). An amendment to TEx. R. Civ. P. 57 requires similar informa-
tion to be included in any filing made with the trial court.
415. See TEX. R. App. P. 4(b) (Vernon 1989).
416. TEx. R. APr. P. 4(b). A companion amendment to the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure establishes an identical scheme for filings made in the trial court. TEX. R. Civ. P. 5.
417. See TEx. R. App. P. 40a(4), 46(d), 74(q), 131(a), 136(h), 190(b).
418. See TEX. R. App. P. 74(a), 91, 131(a), 132(c), 190(c).
419. TEx. R. APP. P. 41, 54 (comments to 1990 changes).
420. TEX. R. App. P. 41(a).
421. TEX. R. ApP. P. 54(a).
422. See TEx. R. App. P. 51(b), 53(a).
423. TEX. R. App. P. 54(a) provides that the transcript and statement of facts shall be filed
within 60 days after the judgment is signed or, if any party has timely filed a motion for new
trial, motion to modify the judgment, or request for findings of fact and conclusions of law,
within 120 days after the judgment is signed.
424. TEX. 'R. App. P. 51(b), 53(a).
425. TEX. R. App. P. 51(b).
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of error to the supreme court. Amended rule 100(g) empowers the supreme
court to review any order of the court of appeals denying a request for an
extension of time to file a motion for rehearing in a civil case.426 Under rule
130, if any party timely files an application for writ of error, any other party
entitled to file an application may do so within forty days after the court of
appeals has overruled the last motion for rehearing timely fied by any
party.427 If, however, a party prematurely files an application for writ of
error, the premature filing does not prevent any other party from filing a
motion for rehearing or the court of appeals from considering any subse-
quently filed motion for rehearing. 428 In these circumstances, the prema-
turely filed application for writ of error will be deemed to have been filed
subsequent to, but on the same date as, the court of appeals' ruling on the
last timely filed motion for rehearing.429
Finally, the supreme court added a provision to rule 5 that closes a loop-
hole which previously existed in the procedure for implementing the delayed
appellate timetables described in the rule.430 Rule 5(b)(5)431 now directs the
trial court to make a specific finding of the date a party first obtained knowl-
edge of the appealable order so as to fix the date from which the appellate
time periods run.
3. Supreme Court Procedures
Various rule amendments clarify or refine procedures used in the supreme
court. For example, a number of amended rules expressly require that par-
ties file twelve copies of certain instruments with the supreme court.432 In
addition, a party may now obtain an extension of time from the supreme
court in which to file a motion for rehearing.433 Finally, the entire proce-
dure for direct appeals to the supreme court has been modified. 434
Other rules were amended to reflect the supreme court's actual practices.
The rules now provide that in each case the court will determine the appro-
426. TEx. R. App. P. 100(g).
427. TEx. R. App. P. 130(c).
428. TEx. R. App. P. 130(b). The amended rule codifies the holding in Doctors Hosp.
Facilities v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 750 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. 1988).
429. TEX. R. APp. P. 130(b).
430. If a party has neither received notice nor acquired actual knowledge of a final judg-
ment or other appealable order within twenty days after the order or judgment was signed, the
appellate filing deadlines will not begin to run until the date the party first received notice or
obtained knowledge of the judgment's signing. TEx. R. App. P. 5(b)(4). The commencement
date for the appellate periods, however, will in no event begin later than 90 days after the
execution of the judgment or order. Id.
431. TEX. R. App. P. 5(b)(5).
432. See TEX. R. App. P. 130(b) (applications for writ of error); TEX. R. App. P. 160
(motions for extension of time).
433. TEx. R. App. P. 190(e) authorizes the supreme court to grant an extension of time to
file a motion for rehearing if a party files a motion reasonably explaining the need for more
time within fifteen days after the motion for rehearing is due. This amendment conforms the
supreme court practice to that of the courts of appeals. See TEX. R. App. P. 54(c).
434. See TEx. R. App. P. 140.
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priate time periods for oral argument,435 and that the clerk's office will an-
nounce all judgments or decrees of the court.436 Rule 133 was amended
expressly to permit the court to explain its denial of an application for writ
of error.437 By deleting section (b) of the same rule, the supreme court made
its review of cases involving conflicts in prior decisions discretionary. 438
4. Miscellaneous
Prior to its amendment, rule 9 provided for the substitution of parties on
appeal in the event of a party's death or separation from public office.439
Section (d) of the rule, which was added by amendment, permits the appel-
late court to order substitution of a successor party in any other situation
that the court decides is necessary or appropriate.44° The supreme court
amended rule 15a,441 which provides for disqualification and recusal of ap-
pellate judges, to almost completely parallel the procedural rule governing
recusal of trial judges.442 Finally, although en banc review of decisions is
still disfavored, amended rule 79 authorizes such review whenever consider-
ation by' the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of
decisions.443
B. Case Authorities
In Warren v. THland Investment Group4" the supreme court held that,
unless an appellant limits an appeal pursuant to rule 40(a)(4),445 an appellee
may complain by cross-point in his brief to the court of appeals of any error
in the trial court between the appellant and the appellee without perfecting
an independent appeal.446 The Warren decision represents the court's sec-
ond pronouncement on this issue in less than a year.44 7 The careful practi-
tioner should note, however, that this rule for appeals to the intermediate
appellate court differs from the rule for appeals to the supreme court. To
obtain a different and more favorable judgment in the supreme court than
that rendered by the court of appeals, a party must file a timely motion for
rehearing and an application for writ of error in the court of appeals. 448
435. TEx. R. Arp. P. 172. Upon the vote of at least six members, the supreme court may
also determine that a cause should be submitted without oral argument. TEX. R. App. P. 170.
436. TEX. R. APP. P. 181.
437. TEx. R. App. P. 133(a).
438. See TEX. R. App. P. 133(b) (repealed 1990).
439. TEx. R. App. P. 9(a), (b), (c).
440. TEX. R. APP. P. 9(d).
441. TEx. R. APP. P. 15a.
442. TEX. R. App. P. 15a explicitly adopted the grounds for disqualification and recusal of
trial judges set forth in TEx. R. Civ. P. 18b.
443. TEX. R. A:Pp. P. 79(e). The rule also continues to permit en banc review in extraordi-
nary circumstances. Id.
444. 779 S.W.2d 808 (rex. 1989).
445. TEX. R. App. P. 40(a)(4).
446. 779 S.W.2d at 809.
447. See Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. 1989).




Mindful of the principles espoused in rule 1,449 the Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals in Riviea v. Marine Drilling Co.450 liberally construed the appel-
late filing rules so as to forgive what otherwise would have been a costly
procedural blunder by the appellant. Rule 54(c) 451 authorizes the court of
appeals to extend the deadline for an appellant's filing of the statement of
facts if the appellant files his motion for an extension within fifteen days after
the statement of facts is due. In response to the appellant's timely filed sec-
ond motion for an extension, the court in Riviea granted an extension until
December 28, 1989, of the filing deadline for the statement of facts.
Although the court reporter missed this extended deadline, she filed the
statement of facts five days later along with an affidavit explaining her inabil-
ity to meet the December 28 cutoff date. The appellant, however, failed to
file a third motion for extension in connection with the court reporter's tar-
diness until three weeks past the filing deadline. A divided court neverthe-
less held that the appellant timely filed the statement of facts because the
appellant filed the court reporter's affidavit within fifteen days of the ex-
tended deadline.45 2 The court acknowledged the supreme court's earlier
holding in B. D. Click v. Safari Drilling Corp.453 that a court of appeals has
no authority to consider a late-filed motion for extension of time.454 But by
treating the court reporter's affidavit as a valid motion for extension, the
court of appeals was able to avoid the harsh result that otherwise would have
been required due to the appellant's delay of twenty-one days in filing its
third motion for extension. 455
In nearly identical circumstances, the supreme court twice during the sur-
vey period refused to punish a party for an error made by the clerk. In Biffle
v. Morton Rubber Industries, Inc.456 the supreme court held that a party
timely filed an appeal bond delivered to the clerk before the deadline for
perfecting the appeal, even though the clerk inadvertently failed to filemark
the bond until after the deadline.4 57 Faced with a similar situation involving
a motion for new trial, the court in Mr. Penguin Tuxedo Rental & Sales, Inc.
v. NCR Corp. 45 8 held that a party was not to blame for the clerk's failure to
timely file-stamp an instrument that had been delivered to the court for filing
prior to the applicable deadline. 459 The rule announced in Biffle and Mr.
449. TEX. R. Civ. P. I directs courts to construe liberally the rules so as to obtain a just,
fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of litigants' rights.
450. 787 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
45 1. TEx. R. APP. P. 54(c).
452. Riviea, 787 S.W.2d at 191.
453. 638 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1982).
454. Riviea, 787 S.W.2d at 190. The court also observed that the rule announced in B. D.
Click was not limited to an original motion for extension of time but also applied to all subse-
quently filed motions for extension. Id. (citing Chojnacki v. The Court of Appeals For the
First Supreme Judicial District, 699 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1985)), discussed in Figari, Graves &
Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 491, 529 (1986).
455. Riviea, 787 S.W.2d at 191.
456. 785 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1990)(per curiam).
457. Id. at 144.
458. 787 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1990).
459. Id. at 372.
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Penguin accords with prior holdings of the court4  and is intended to pro-




Several of the recent amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
should affect local court rules. A new provision of Rule 3a 46 2 supplants
local rules establishing timetables at variance with the state rules, and rnakes
the timetables incorporated in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
mandatory. Another new feature to rule 3a precludes local courts from us-
ing unpublished local rules or standard local practices to determine issues of
substantive merit.463 Under amended rule 3a, no local rule, order or prac-
tice of any court, other than those that fully comply with rule 3a, may be
applied to determine the merits of any matter.4" Amendments to rule
245,465 which governs the assignment of cases for trial, should also affect
local practices. A new provision of the rule provides that a request for trial
setting constitutes a representation that the requesting party reasonably and
in good faith expects to be ready for trial by the date requested." 6 Unlike
some existing local rules in various districts, the amended rule does not re-
quire other representations about trial readiness to obtain a trial setting."67
Pursuant to the amended rule, parties are also now entitled to at least forty-
five days notice of a case's first setting for trial." 8
The supreme court completely rewrote three other procedural rules dur-
ing the recently enacted amendments. Unlike its predecessor, amended rule
10469 now permits an attorney to withdraw from representing a party only
upon written motion for good cause, even if the party substitutes another
attorney as counsel of record. The amended rule also clarifies the procedure
to be followed in cases where an attorney withdraws without another attor-
ney immediately substituting as counsel.470 The supreme court also substan-
tially broadened the rule governing pretrial conferences471 to resemble
closely its federal counterpart. 472 The amended rule permits the court and
parties to consider the following matters, among other things; at a pretrial
460. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Laoke, 585 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. 1979) (instrument is
deemed filed in law when it is delivered to clerk regardless of whether it is filemarked).
461. 785 S.W.2d at 144.
462. TEX. R. Civ. P. 3a(2).
463. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 3a(6).
464. Id.
465. TEX. R. Civ. P. 245.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. When a case has previously been set for trial, however, the court may reset the
case to a later date on any reasonable notice or by agreement of the parties. Id.
469. TEX. R. Civ. P. 10.
470. Id.
471. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166.
472. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
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conference: (1) a discovery schedule;473 (2) the exchange of witness lists;474
(3) the marking and exchange of exhibits; 475 (4) a proposed jury charge, or
proposed findings and conclusions in a nonjury case;476 and (5) settle-
ment.477 The court also essentially rewrote rule 183478 to adopt procedures
for the appointment and compensation of interpreters.
Two other miscellaneous rule amendments bear mention. As a result of
an amendment to rule 4,479 Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays are no longer
counted in any time periods of five days or less specified in the rules except in
certain circumstances. 480 Rule 687481 was also amended to conform with an
amendment to rule 680 made two years ago.48 2 Under the amended rule, a
temporary restraining order (TRO) must set a date for the temporary injunc-
tion hearing that is not later than fourteen days from the date of the TRO.48 3
. Case Authorities
1. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens gives a court discretionary power
to decline jurisdiction when the convenience of the parties and the ends of
justice would be better served if another court should hear the action. The
issue in Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro 484 focused on whether the legislature
statutorily abolished the doctrine of forum non conveniens in wrongful
death and personal injury actions arising out of incidents in foreign states or
countries. The plaintiffs in the case were eighty-two Costa Rican employees
of Standard Fruit Company. The employees sued Dow Chemical Company
and Shell Oil Company claiming that they had suffered personal injuries
from their exposure to a pesticide manufactured by the defendants. A Har-
ris County district court concluded it had jurisdiction to hear the case under
the governing statute.48 5 The district court, nevertheless, dismissed the case
on the basis of forum non conveniens. 48 6 The court of appeals reversed the
trial court's decision, holding that the legislature had statutorily abolished
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in suits brought under section
473. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(c).
474. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(h), (i).
475. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(l).
476. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(k).
477. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(o).
478. TEX. R. Civ. P. 183.
479. TEX. R. Civ. P. 4 provides the method for computing any time periods specified by
the rules.
480. These days are still counted for purposes of the three-day periods in TEX. R. Civ. P.
21 & 21a, extending other periods by three days when a certain type of service is used, and for
purposes of the five-day periods provided for under TEx. R. Civ. P. 748-49c.
481. TEx. R. Civ. P. 687.
482. The 1988 amendment to TEx. R. Civ. P. 680 authorized trial courts to enter tempo-
rary restraining orders up to fourteen days in length.
483. TEx. R. Civ. P. 687(e).
484. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
485. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (Vernon 1975)(recodified as TEx. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CoDE § 71.031 (Vernon 1986)).
486. 786 S.W.2d at 675.
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71.031487 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.488
In a lengthy opinion containing two separate- concurrences and four dis-
sents, a sharply divided supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeals. 489 According to the majority, the language in section 71.031(a)
providing that actions "may be enforced in the courts of this state" pre-
vented a trial court from relinquishing its jurisdiction under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.490 Adverting to a 1932 writ refused decision of the
El Paso court of appeals, which the majority considered controlling,491 the
Dow court held that the legislature, in enacting the predecessor of section
71.031,492 had conferred an absolute right on citizens of foreign states or
countries to maintain certain wrongful death or personal injury actions in
the Texas courts. 493 In his dissent, Justice Gonzalez argued that the legisla-
ture could not have intended to preclude application of forum non con-
veniens to suits brought under the statute because the doctrine did not exist
in Texas until after the predecessors to section 71.031 were enacted.494 The
majority disagreed, stating that the doctrine of forum non conveniens ap-
peared in Texas well before the legislature's enactment of article 4678 in
1913. 495 The majority was likewise untroubled by the dissenting justices'
expressed fears that the Dow holding would transform Texas into an irresisti-
ble forum of last resort for all mass disaster lawsuits.496
2. Entry of Judgment by Substitute Judges
Rule 18 authorizes a successor judge to hear and dispose of all pending
motions in a court when a judge dies, resigns, or becomes disabled during
the court's term. 497 The rule does not, however, expressly provide for a suc-
cessor judge to render judgment in a nonjury trial over which he did not
preside. Accordingly, the appeals court in W.C. Banks, Inc. v. Team, Inc.498
vacated a judgment entered by a trial judge in a nonjury case that was actu-
ally heard by his predecessor. The court noted that there was no evidence
that the predecessor judge had died, resigned, or become disabled, thereby
rendering rule 18 inapplicable. 499
487. TE x. Civ. P.Ac. & REM. CODE § 71.031 (Vernon 1986) provides that actions for
wrongful death or personal injury arising from events in foreign states or countries may be
brought in Texas under certain circumstances.
488. Alfaro v. Dow Chemical, 751 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988),
aff'd 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
489. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 679.
490. Id. at 675.
491. Id. at 678, (citing Allen v. Bass, 47 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1932, writ
ref'd)).
492. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. A.NN. art. 4678, (Vernon 1975).
493. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 678-679.
494. Id. at 691 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
495. Id. at 676; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 4678 (Vernon 1975), recodified as TEX.
Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 71.031 (Vernon 1986).
496. Id. at 690 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
497. TEx. R. Civ. P. 18.
498. 783 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).




Finally, in Dorchester Master Ltd. Partnership v. Hunt5°° the supreme
court held that a party timely filed an appeal bond on Tuesday, December
27, because the Monday after Christmas is a legal holiday whenever Christ-
mas falls on a Sunday.50 1 The respondents argued that rule 5(a), 502 which
provides for the computation of time periods on appeal, defined as "holi-
days" only those dates specified in article 4591.503 The court admitted that
the referenced statute did not include December 26 as one of the holidays
listed. Nevertheless, the court chose to ignore the literal terms of rule 5
limiting holidays to those defined by the statute in favor of a definition of
holidays based on "popular acceptance." 504
500. 790 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1990)(per curiam).
501. Id. at 551-52.
502. TEx. R. App. P. 5(a).
503. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4591 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
504. Hunt, 790 S.W.2d at 552-53. The court's 1990 amendment to TEx. R. APP. P. 5(a),
deleting the reference to article 4591, should eliminate any future misunderstandings.
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